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Summary
Title: Services on the Mobile Internet
Author: Jonas Andersson
Supervisors: Per M. Andersson and Robert E. Cole
Purpose:  The purpose of  this thesis is to describe and analyze the services 
on the mobile Internet and to identify when, where, and how these 
service offerings can be profi table.
Method: The thesis is a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with 
key stakeholders in the service value chain and with relevant ex-
perts.
Case methodology have been used to gather and structure the em-
pirical material from three cases, i-mode in Japan, SMS in Europe, 
and BlackBerry in the USA to be able to generate new theory as 
well as expand on existing theory.
Analysis: The analysis, based on the three cases, generates and validates a 
model for successful service strategy on the mobile Internet. The 
service strategy is called service-driven technology development.
Conclusion: Service-driven technology development explains the success of  
the three cases and provides a framework to successfully develop, 
implement, and maintain profi table services on the mobile Internet.
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81. Introduction
This chapter describes the thesis and introduces the reader to the subject of  services on the mobile 
Internet. First there is a defi nition of  the problem followed by a statement of  the thesis objective. 
Finally the synopsis explains how the chapters are constructed and related to each other.
1.1 Background
Three different industries coming together
The telecommunications industry is merging with the media industry and the 
computer industry; the result of  their interaction is sometimes referred to as the 
infocom industry. The three industries are coming together for several reasons, 
but most of  us would simply argue that the development of  technology has made 
it possible. The telecommunications industry is moving from mobile voice com-
munication to mobile data communication, which is commonly referred to as the 
third generation network (3G). The computer industry is moving from desktops 
and laptops to palmtops, and the sale of  wireless computer equipment is now 
an established and expanding market and an integral part of  the software (SW) 
world. The media industry is looking for new ways to distribute and promote its 
content, and the Internet as well as the mobile Internet are viewed as the distribu-
tion channels. The difference between the Internet and the mobile Internet is that 
all data communication on the mobile Internet is done wirelessly. 
Media 
Industry
Computer 
Industry
Telecom 
Industry
Figure 1: Convergence of  
industries to form 
infocom
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High expectations
These three industries are today in different stages of  maturity, but all of  them 
expect to profi t from the new products and services of  the mobile Internet. All in-
volved parties have made heavy investments, some more than others. One that has 
captured a lot of  attention was the auction of  spectrum licenses; network opera-
tors spent around $200 billion worldwide to snap up 3G licenses in recent years, 
running up enormous debts in the process.1 
How to generate revenue
The question that is asked over and over again is how the industry will recoup 
these investments. Factors such as the over-hyped introduction of  WAP (wireless 
application protocol), the recent global economic downturn, and the avoidance of  
the telecom industry by the venture capital community (at least for the moment) 
have added to the growing concern about how the industry is going to recoup its 
investments. Jakob Nielsen, a usability expert, said to InternetNews about WAP: 
“Its usability did not meet expectations, but even worse, WAP was generally com-
municated to the public as the fi rst step to the mobile Internet.”2 Therefore, its 
“failure” potentially will damage the reception of  future offerings.
The key to success: services
There are, however, success stories, such as SMS in Europe, i-mode in Japan, and 
BlackBerry in the United States. These companies’ successes show that there is 
great revenue potential in offering services on the mobile Internet. The functional 
business models and vast amount of  services that exist on the Internet today are 
valuable sources of  information about how services on the mobile Internet can be 
implemented and executed. 
1.2 Problem area
The problem addressed by this thesis is the lack of  effective and profi table service 
strategies on the mobile Internet. In this immature market there are not yet any 
proven strategies or even best practices. Still there are some cases that when ana-
lyzed provide valuable information about key success factors for service strategies.
What becomes clear after discussion with stakeholders is that there is an institu-
tional memory within each of  the three different industries. They all have very 
different approaches to infocom, which refl ect their respective histories and give 
rise to confl icting interests. However, they all have a common interest in fi nding 
business opportunities on the mobile Internet. Three questions were repeatedly 
brought up in the interviews by the interviewee:
• What successful business models exist, and why are they working?
• Where is the potential revenue and how do companies generate it?
• What constitutes a successful service strategy?
1.3 Purpose
The purpose of  this thesis is to describe and analyze services on the mobile Inter-
net and attempt to determine success factors for service strategies.
1  http://www.ovum.com
2 Jakob Nielsen, 
InternetNews, March 2, 2002.
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1.4 Target audience
The target audience for this thesis is professionals who are working with or are 
planning to work with service strategies for the mobile Internet. Some level of  
understanding of  the Internet and the mobile Internet is expected from the reader, 
but the thesis should be digestible without in-depth industry or technical knowl-
edge.
Students and teachers studying the Internet, mobile Internet, infocom industry, 
and service industries might also fi nd this thesis useful.
1.5 Limitations
The thesis aims to have a global perspective, which is clearly applicable to the tele-
communications and computer industry. At the same time, service strategies must 
be attuned to local conditions and culture. Data were collected and this thesis was 
written during the period from Fall 2001 to Summer 2002.
1.6 Synopsis
Chapter 1
gives an introduction to the
topic and describes the
problem and the purpose
Chapter 2
describes the methodology
used in the thesis.
Chapter 3
describes the theories that are
used for the analysis.
Chapter 5
Case A: BlackBerry in the USA
Chapter 6
Case B: SMS in Europe
Chapter 7
Case C: I-mode in Japan
Chapter 8
analyzes the three cases using
presented theory and
methodology
Chapter 9
extracts results from the key
findings and attempts to
generalize to a generic case
Chapter 4
provides value-chain overview
Figure 2:  Synopsis and thesis 
structure
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2. Method
This chapter describes the method and methodology used to gather the data that support the 
results, interpretations, explanations, and predictions of  this thesis. The empirical fi ndings are 
based on secondary data gathered from industry sources, experts, and consulting fi rms, combined 
with primary data from interviews conducted in both the United States and Sweden with repre-
sentatives of  key stakeholders. The methodology of  interviews is given special attention because 
it is a major determinant of  the fi ndings.
2.1 Initial approach
I conducted the research for this thesis alone, which is not common practice in 
writing a master’s thesis. To compensate for this, I relied on an informal virtual 
support group or network to discuss and review the research as it progressed. 
Their feedback was valuable throughout the process.  
The work was to some extent iterative because interviews often raised new ques-
tions and ideas that were subsequently explored.  During this initial period, differ-
ent secondary data sources were consulted as well. UC Berkeley’s online resources 
as well as other online Internet resources provided extensive background data. 
The searches where done with two purposes in mind: to fi nd reports and articles 
that could provide background and a snapshot of  the current situation, and to 
create a dynamic, constantly growing directory that could be addressed continu-
ously during the research.
Before selecting the methodology and theories, I conducted some initial inter-
views to ask questions, refi ne initial thoughts, and set a direction for the thesis. 
These interviews were less structured than the later interviews and focused on es-
tablishing the scope for the thesis. My own background in research and develop-
ment, as well as in sales and marketing within the telecommunications company 
Ericsson, provided me with a valuable network of  contacts.
2.2 Empirical framework
The work is exploratory and the main focus has been to gather data that give 
different perspectives on services on the mobile Internet. In order to understand 
this relatively new concept there has also been a need to collect related data. The 
related data can be characterized as either directly or indirectly related to the main 
topic. Information directly related to services on the mobile Internet includes 
economic data, technology data, and regulatory information. Indirectly related 
sources are those from different areas where similar developments have occurred 
or where directly involved players have already acted in a special way.
The initial study was also aimed at fi nding cases that could illustrate success-
ful mobile services. I chose three cases: i-mode in Japan, SMS in Europe, and 
BlackBerry in the United States. Many interviewees used these companies to 
illustrate points and make comparisons. These companies also represent different 
demographic customer bases, thereby illustrating different approaches to market 
segmentation and value. The way in which data were collected for the three cases 
was essentially the same, though i-mode and BlackBerry are more easily associ-
ated with one company and SMS is associated with several companies
Services on the Mobile Internet
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The selection of  cases was conducted in an iterative way. The three cases seemed 
to represent the industry and services on the mobile Internet without making the 
analysis overly detailed or complicated. Further, the geographical coverage of  the 
cases the U.S., Europe, and Japan illustrates the global reach of  the mobile Inter-
net and at the same time exemplifi es the local differences.
Another objective for the study was to identify a value chain that could be used 
to structure the industry and show interdependencies. The immaturity of  the 
industry makes the value chain subject to discussion, but constructing a concep-
tion of  what the emergent value chain will look like is helpful nevertheless. The 
nature of  the value chain was a recurring question in all the interviews. Although 
the interviewees shared an understanding of  what the value chain is and repre-
sents, their descriptions of  its features differed. The differences could sometimes 
be related to the position a company wanted to take, but in some cases there was 
clearly an expectation that certain stakeholders did or did not do things that they 
were or were not expected to do.
More of  the early interviews were conducted with generalists, and more of  the 
later ones with companies and specialists. But there were exceptions to this be-
cause the process of  planning interviews is sometimes unpredictable. The mix of  
interviews was also inversely proportional to the collection of  secondary sources 
and Web material, with the latter being a rather large part in the beginning.
2.3 Case study methodology
In case study research, individual cases are used as the foundation to develop 
theories to describe recurring themes or events that can be generalized. An im-
portant reference work on case study methodology is Robert K. Yin’s Case Study 
Methodology (1994). According to Yin, a case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not obvious.
A case study is a useful tool for social science research strategies. Table 1 lists the 
characteristics of  various research strategies.
Strategy / 
Characteristics
Form of  research 
question
Requires control over 
behavioural events
Focuses on 
contemporary events?
Experiment How, why Yes Yes
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much
No Yes
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how 
many, how much
No Yes/no
History How, why No No
Case study How, why No Yes
Table 1: Uses of  different 
research strategies
Source: Yin (1994). 
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One case study can provide opportunities for multiple levels of  analysis (Yin, 
1994). For example, the Warwick study of  competitiveness and strategic change 
within UK corporations is conducted at two levels, namely, industry and fi rm 
(Pettigrew, 1998).
The case study can also be used to test theory or to generate theory. Table 2 de-
scribes how theory can be derived from case study research. According to Eisen-
hardt (1989), theories derived from case study research are likely to be novel, 
testable, and have empirical validity because of  their intimate linkage with empiri-
cal evidence. Further, the contributions of  case studies to theory-building make it 
especially suitable for new research areas where existing theories seem inadequate.
Step Activity Reason
Getting started Defi nition of  research 
question
Focuses effort
Possibly a priori constructs Provides better grounding
Selecting cases Neither theory nor 
hypothesis
Retains theoretical fl exibility
Specifi ed population Constrains extraneous variation 
and sharpens external validity
Theoretical, not random 
sampling
Focuses effort on theoretical useful 
cases
Crafting instruments and 
protocols
Multiple data collection 
methods
Strengthens grounding of  theory 
by triangulation of  evidence
Qualitative and quantitative 
data combined
Synergistic view of  evidence
Multiple investigators Fosters divergent perspectives
Entering the fi eld Overlap data collection 
and analysis
Speeds analyses and reveals helpful 
adjustments to data collection
Flexible and opportunistic 
data collection methods
Allows investigators to take 
advantage of  emergent themes
Analyzing data Within-case analysis Gains familiarity with data and 
preliminary theory generation
Cross-case pattern search Forces investigators to take 
advantage of  emergent themes and 
unique case features
Shaping hypothesis Interactive tabulation of  
evidence
Sharpens construct defi nition, 
validity, and measurability
Replication, not sampling, 
logic across cases
Confi rms, extends, and sharpens 
theory
Search evidence for “why” 
behind relationships
Builds internal validity
Enfolding literature Comparison with 
confl icting literature
Builds internal validity, raises 
theoretical level, and sharpens 
defi nitions
Comparison with similar 
literature
Sharpens generalizability, improves 
construct defi nitions, and raises 
theoretical level
Sharpens generalizability, 
improves construct defi nitions, 
and raises theoretical level
Theoretical saturation 
when possible
Ends process when marginal 
improvement becomes small
Table 2: Building theory from 
case study research
Source: Eisenhardt (1989) 
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2.4 Theoretical framework
Using the theoretical framework I have selected, my aim is to extract the key ele-
ments of  successful services on the mobile Internet. The theoretical framework 
guided all of  the data collection and analysis. During the process, however, some 
of  the supporting theories were discarded and others were added. 
The starting point is an industry analysis based on Porter’s “fi ve forces” and the 
value-chain model. Porter’s well-known model together with recent articles, vali-
dating it for the network economy as well, provides a clear understanding of  the 
competitive landscape. The value chain outlines the value-adding activities that 
have to take place to be able to provide a mobile service.
The next step is focused on the core competencies of  the different players to de-
termine where their strengths are and what differentiates them from one another. 
This is also used to some extent to explore what possibilities are created by the 
three merging industries (telecom, computer, and media).
Supporting this analysis are several theories that were selected because they are 
directly targeted at technology-intensive industries, such as the mobile Internet. 
The main supporting theories revolve around open standards and technology 
management. Open standards are recurring phenomena in telecom and in many 
other industries as well. Many companies in the telecom world have declared their 
support for open standards, and sometimes only support open standards. The 
theories around standards provide a rationale for this thinking and also highlight 
some of  the issues faced by companies that provide services on the mobile Inter-
net
Aside from technology, I focus on the service value chain. Some service indus-
tries do have a strong technology component, but generally service theories do 
not assume this. Because there is a continuum from what a service is to what a 
product is, the use of  this theoretical framework aims to support the extraction 
of  the service component and describe the interfaces and interaction between 
product and service. 
There are no specifi c theories, at least none generally accepted, developed specifi -
cally about services on the mobile Internet. This is because the industry is still 
immature and the empirical foundation for theory-building has not been avail-
able until recently. This makes the case study methodology an attractive tool for 
formulating an approach.
2.5 Interviews
Interviews are the primary data source and the basis for the empirical chapter. 
They were conducted with the goal of  describing the service environment on 
the mobile Internet. I attempted to fi nd and interview people with professional 
expertise in this area.  
To accommodate the time constraints of  the interviewees, my preparation for 
each interview was rigorous, and the interviews were used primarily to clarify gray 
areas that the secondary sources could not cover. The interviews were also used 
to validate source material and whenever possible were set up to complement 
each other.
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The interviewees can be divided into two basic groups: the experts and the pri-
mary stakeholders. The expert should not be partial towards a specifi c solution or 
business model and therefore could be viewed as independent, whereas the pri-
mary stakeholder has a clear bias. My feeling is that the actual difference between 
experts and primary stakeholders is small, but it is noticeable and understandable 
because company employees naturally promote their own companies’ products. 
2.6 Data sources
As a part of  the interview I included a question asking what other people I 
should interview and what other data that I should collect to advance my analysis 
(Thomas, 1989). Answers to both questions allowed me to collect more data and 
information that often cast further light on the interviewees’ statements. I also 
occasionally followed up with e-mails asking additional questions or for further 
clarifi cation. 
As a complement to the interviews, secondary sources included business and 
professional periodicals, trade association reports, investor newsletters, analyst re-
ports, whitepapers, and online articles. Other sources of  useful information were 
lectures and classes at the University of  California, Berkeley, fellow students, and 
invited guests from the industry.
2.7 Critique of sources
I had some diffi culty gaining access to the people and corporations that would be 
the best to interview (Thomas, 1989). In addition, there is always a concern that 
interviewees will tell only the offi cial version of  events and strategies in order not 
to reveal company secrets or jeopardize their careers.
An interviewer may also skew the interview by asking biased questions or by 
interpreting or transcribing information inaccurately. Although I transcribed most 
of  the interviews within twenty-four hours of  conducting them, errors still may 
have occurred.
2.8 Critique of method
The provision of  services usually brings to mind the end user. For this thesis, 
however, I have done no end user research; the consumer information in the 
cases presented is taken from prior research because a consumer study of  any sig-
nifi cance would have been extremely resource intensive. Therefore, the approach 
in all three cases was to rely on information from successful service providers and 
to try to identify key customer criteria for achieving that success through second-
ary sources.
The research covers a broad geographic area, and the industry investigated is 
large and complex. The amount of  information available is so huge that the 
methodology of  limiting the study to three cases and then extrapolating the re-
sults to the whole industry is necessarily a risky exercise.  
Services on the Mobile Internet
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3. Theory
This chapter outlines the theories that are used in the analysis. The aim is to acquaint the reader 
with the theoretical foundation that underlies the subsequent analysis. The fi rst section  provides 
a framework for industry analysis and briefl y describes Porter’s fi ve forces and the value chain. 
The section about resources and core competencies lists the theories for analyzing the fi rm’s inter-
nal possibilities. Because the thesis is about services, the service profi t chain is an integral part in 
defi ning and describing strategies. The last section offers some interesting supporting theories that 
especially focus on standards and the management of  technology. 
3.1 Introduction
Several theories are useful in describing and analyzing service provision on the 
mobile Internet. The choice was therefore to use a few well-established and 
generally accepted strategy theories that provide suffi cient tools for analyzing the 
cases and the data.
The two main strategy theories are competitive strategy and resource-based strat-
egy. While Porter’s fi ve forces focus on external factors, the core competencies 
model focuses internally on a fi rm’s capabilities and what those capabilities enable. 
The resource-based theory stresses a fi rm’s core competencies and takes into ac-
count nimble, knowledge-intensive, and technology-intensive industries. 
I use Porter’s fi ve-forces model together with the value-chain model to do an 
industry overview and analysis of  the competitive landscape for the different ac-
tors. The identifi cation of  the core competencies and the use of  a resource-based 
approach make the different stakeholders in the value chain more transparent. 
3.2 The fi ve forces and the value chain
Michael Porter’s competition-based strategy theory is the Five Forces of  Com-
petition (FFC), which focuses on the competition between actors in the market 
(Porter, 1982). The theory considers a company’s external environment and how 
this environment affects the company’s competitiveness and profi tability. FFC can 
be used to determine how and against what a company can defend itself  or how a 
company could position itself  to advance to a more profi table position. The fi ve 
forces are shown in Figure 3.
Services on the Mobile Internet
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INDUSTRY
COMPETITORS
Rivalry Among
Existing Firms
SUPPLIERS
SUBSTITUTES
BUYERS
POTENTIAL
ENTRANTS
Threat of
new entrants
Threat of
substitute products
or services
Bargining power
of suppliers
Bargining power
of buyers
Figure 3: Forces driving 
industry competition 
(Porter, 1982)
Porter’s theory around the fi ve forces of  competition, which was developed in 
the 1970s before the Internet, has led to a discussion of  how valid it is to de-
scribe the industry today. In response, Porter argues that industry structure in the 
Internet era can still be described by the fi ve forces and that sustainable competi-
tive advantage comes from operational effectiveness or strategic positioning (Por-
ter, 2001). The Internet has not changed the established ways of  thinking about 
strategy, but it has affected the fi ve forces and the industry boundaries. Porter 
further argues that operational effectiveness is not a strategy and that strategic 
positioning can only be achieved by doing things differently than your competi-
tors (Porter, 1996). Differently means either performing different activities or 
performing similar activities in different ways. 
The value chain is the set of  activities through which a product or service is cre-
ated and delivered to customers (Porter, 1982). This is true in any industry, and 
it provides a framework for identifying all value-creating activities and analyzing 
how they affect costs for the company and the value they deliver to customers. 
The value chain is linked to suppliers, channels, and customers. The Internet has 
had a profound impact on these linkages as well as on the different activities in 
the value chain. This is mainly because each activity involves the creation, pro-
cessing, and communication of  information and data.
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Figure 4:  Generic value chain 
(Michael Porter)
3.3 Core competencies and resource-based theory
A company’s core competencies are identifi ed or classifi ed by three different cri-
teria (Prahalad, 1990). First, the competency should provide access to a wide vari-
ety of  markets. Second, the competency should make a signifi cant contribution to 
the product’s or service’s perceived customer benefi t. Finally a core competency 
should be hard for competitors to imitate, and this should be viewed from the 
perspective that there is a complex interaction between different core competen-
cies in the company.
It is important to be clear what your company’s core competencies are or will be 
and to make choices based on these competencies. Otherwise it will be hard to 
make intelligent decisions about, for example, alliances and sourcing strategies or 
how to establish new competencies in order to compete with emerging business-
es. There is also a linkage between the end product and the core competencies, 
and that linkage is the core product. The reason for distinguishing between core 
competencies, core products, and end products is that the nature of  competition 
is different in each case. 
A resource-based strategy complements a competition-based strategy because 
it looks at a company’s internal capabilities and resources according to how well 
they are aligned with its external goals. The company’s internal resources are all 
the assets, possibilities, organizational processes, company attributes, information, 
knowledge, and so on that are controlled by the fi rm and that make it possible to 
implement and execute strategies (Barney, 1991). This is expressed in the corpo-
rate strategy triangle (Figure 5), which shows that a company’s resources, busi-
ness, structure, system and processes should be coordinated so that the company 
can fulfi ll its goals and move towards its vision (Collis and Montgomery, 1998). 
Services on the Mobile Internet
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Figure 5: The corporate strat-
egy triangle (Collis 
and Montgomery, 
1998)
If  a company has resources that can be combined in a unique way relative to its 
competitors, it will have a competitive advantage. This competitive advantage will 
be sustainable when it becomes diffi cult for the company’s competitors to copy 
the resources and execute the same strategy. Likewise, a company is limited by 
the resources it has and to what extent or how fast it can develop or acquire new 
resources.
3.4 The service profi t chain
The service profi t chain has been derived from successful service organizations 
and puts “hard” values on “soft” measures (Heskett, 1994). The service profi t 
chain establishes the relationships between operating strategy and service delivery 
systems via the external service value received by customers and their concomi-
tant satisfaction and loyalty, which generate revenue growth and profi tability.
Internal
Service
Quality
Emplyee
Satisfaction
Emplyee
Retention
Emplyee
Productivity
External
Service
Value
Customer
Satisfaction
Customer
Loyality
Revenue
Growth
Profitability
OPERATING STRATEGY AND
SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEM
Figure 6: Links in the Ser-
vice-Profi t Chain 
(Heskett, 1994)
A key argument related to services is that the “quality” of  market share, measured 
in terms of  customer loyalty, deserves just as much attention as the quantity of  
market share (Reichheld and Schefter, 2000). Loyalty is, according to the service 
chain, a direct result of  customer satisfaction, and this satisfaction is the value 
perceived by the customer, which means the satisfaction of  the customer in 
relation to the total cost. The total cost is the price of  the service plus the cost as-
sociated with acquiring the service.
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3.5 Standards
The telecommunications industry is heavily infl uenced by standards that are often 
referred to as open, meaning that the standard is free to use and that licensing of  
the necessary patents is done under fair and reasonable terms. In contrast to open 
standards, there are closed standards or industry standards. Shapiro and Varian 
(1999) have identifi ed seven key elements that are critical to establishing an indus-
try standard. However, if  one or more of  these are not under a company’s direct 
control, it is better to establish an open standard.
An installed base of  users
Intellectual property rights
Ability to innovate
First-mover advantage
Manufacturing capabilities
Strength in complements
Brand name and reputation
Table 3: Seven critical factors 
for controlling a 
standard
Source: Shapiro, Varian 
(1994).
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4. The value chain
This chapter identifi es and describes the value chain as well as the different players in the mobile 
Internet. The last chapter describes attempts to achieve horizontal integration in the value chain.
4.1 Value chain
The value chain for services on the mobile Internet is described by fi ve partici-
pants: the content provider, the network, the system integrator, the operator, and 
terminals. The different stakeholders are today all developing services in relative 
isolation from each other because some elements of  the value chain are still not 
linked. Because the mobile Internet is an immature industry, the different play-
ers are still trying to fi nd their niches and match their future interests. In these 
efforts, exploratory alliances occasionally emerge (usually with a press release), 
some of  which develop and others of  which simply disappear.
Mapping the three merging industries (Figure 1) along the mobile Internet value 
chain illustrates some of  the possible problems. All three industries already have 
established value chains. The telecommunications industry maps into the network 
and terminal manufacturers and the operators; together they have already estab-
lished a relationship. The media industry is represented in the value chain by the 
content provider. The computer industry is more diffi cult to map onto a specifi c 
box in the value chain, since it is part of  all the boxes (see Figure 7).
Content Network SystemIntegrator Operator Terminal
Figure 7: The value chain for 
the mobile Internet.
4.2 Content
Content on the mobile Internet can be anything that is possible to digitize. The 
content aggregator collects and distributes content from several content develop-
ers. From a user’s perspective, it is the words, pictures, and sounds–simply, the 
multimedia experience–that he or she is prepared to pay for. Companies that put 
this content into the context of  a mobile device hope consumers will be willing 
to pay for it, and maybe even pay more than they would for the same content in a 
non-mobile device.
Typical content in the media industry includes news, weather, sports scores, stock 
quotes, traffi c information, music, movies, games, and more. The current discus-
sion of  content on the mobile Internet often includes the terms value-adding con-
tent, premium content, and Content with a capital C. This kind of  content should also 
be separated from user-originated content such as SMS messages and e-mail.
There are two major issues for the content industry today: cost and security. 
Besides the obvious point that the content developer wants to get paid, security 
has become one of  the major problems for the industry. DRM (digital rights 
management) technology aims to control the distribution of  digitized content in 
time and space, which is just what the Internet adds. However, with this control 
comes a competitive advantage to the owner of  the DRM system or standard that 
is often tightly connected to the payment system. There are also strong forces 
pushing for changes in legislation around digital content and how it can be used 
and distributed, so there is a great deal of  uncertainty about the future. 
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The media industry is today a highly concentrated and mature market with a few 
players controlling most of  the content: about 20% of  the companies control 
80% of  the content. The existing content industry already has well-established 
distribution and promotion channels; its use of  the mobile Internet for distribu-
tion as well as promotion will directly affect those existing channels. Some argue 
that the new ways of  distribution will change the balance between existing rela-
tionships in the media industry, but others do not believe this will happen. His-
torically the content industry has adopted new technology very slowly, trying to 
exploit existing revenue sources as much as possible before changing and acting 
in a predatory fashion.
The content aggregators gather and reprocess content from one or many content 
providers. Content aggregators add value by creating packages that can be more 
or less customized for the customer and tailored for a mobile device. The content 
aggregators are often called mobile Internet portals; in fact, many Internet portals 
also have a mobile Internet portal among their offerings.
The portals would like to be the starting place and the gateway for the user of  the 
mobile Internet. By combining content from different sources and other services, 
they hope that the user will use their portal to do everything, thus making their 
services more valuable. 
All the players in the value chain have their own approach to controlling the 
traffi c fl ow and increasing the exposure of  their services to the end user. Con-
tent creators use interactive content that guides end users, and operators use 
their control of  the network to display their preferred page fi rst. Mobile handset 
manufacturers use their control of  the terminal to have their preferred homepage 
as a preset bookmark.
4.3 Network
The infrastructure equipment is the hardware that connects the different parts of  
a mobile network. Infrastructure equipment vendors for the mobile Internet are 
the same vendors that provided the equipment historically for the fi xed networks 
all over the world. It is these companies that are largely pushing the mobile Inter-
net market forward. Banking on the future, infrastructure equipment providers 
are building networks, even though many of  the applications and services that 
will make those networks economical have not yet been developed. 
The network manufacturers also provide network management systems and bill-
ing systems specifi cally for their networks. The management system physically 
controls the network, and the billing system keeps track of  the users on the net-
work and ensures that the operator can charge users for services provided. Once 
the network is installed and operating, the upgrade of  these systems is a major 
revenue source for the network manufacturers and a way to add new features to 
the network.
Virtually all telecom network equipment is based on open standards that have 
been developed jointly by the network manufacturers and operators.  However, 
the open standard only provides interfaces between the main building blocks and 
uses specialized telecom protocols. This makes these systems more integrated 
than the Internet-protocol (IP)-based network equipment that builds up the 
Internet. 
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The emerging trend in the telecom standard is to move towards IP-based solutions 
and interfaces between the different components. This will break up the highly in-
tegrated telecom networks usually built with equipment from one or two manufac-
turers and allow new players and a higher degree of  specialization from equipment 
manufacturers. 
4.4 System integrator
The demand for system integration–the assembly of  more complex mobile net-
works consisting of  equipment from many vendors–will increase. System inte-
gration is becoming a more important part of  the traditional telecom equipment 
vendor business as well as a new fi eld for system integrators that had earlier spe-
cialized in building up the Internet. However, because the network suppliers have 
well-established distribution channels and relationships, system integrators use 
those channels to gain access to the network operator.
If  in the 3G value chain the network constitutes the hardware, the system integra-
tor constitutes the software. Knowledge about equipment from many network 
manufacturers, as well as repeated implementation projects, has provided the 
system integrators with a software base that makes traditional billing systems and 
network management systems provided by network equipment suppliers a subset 
and an exchangeable part of  a larger offering. 
The current trend is for applications and services to be developed and imple-
mented primarily by the system integrator. Network providers, operators, content 
providers, and handset manufacturers have with few exceptions abandoned this 
fi eld after unsuccessful and expensive trials. One reason was the initial and still 
existing assumption that applications and services were the same. An application is 
the technical solutionfor example, a billing system or a messaging solution–whereas 
a service is the complete offering to the customer or end user. 
4.5 Operator
Traditionally, the operator or carrier has owned and operated the network and 
owned the relationship with the customer. There are also more and more virtual 
operators that do not own their own network but buy network capacity from other 
operators and try to differentiate through services or price. These virtual opera-
tors are in some cases new businesses with compelling new offerings for end users; 
in other cases they are existing businesses that have expanded to include the mo-
bile channel as a complement to an existing business. In addition, more and more 
established operators are letting equipment manufacturers take over the day-to-day 
operation of  their network in an effort to be more cost-effi cient. 
The fi rst mobile operators were the same as the traditional ones, very often govern-
ment-owned fi xed telecom operators. However, a wave of  deregulation all over the 
world ensured that these monopolies were dissolved and new entrants were allowed. 
There is, however, still government-enforced control over the air spectrum, how 
this spectrum is used, and who can use it. This air spectrum translates directly into 
bandwidth, which has become increasingly scarce, especially with the introduction 
of  3G, even if  spectrum utilization is getting more effi cient all the time with new 
technology. To distribute this bandwidth, many governments around the world have 
held spectrum auctions, and operators have spent huge amounts for licenses grant-
ing them exclusive rights for a certain amount of  time (twenty years, for example). 
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The investment in licenses is based on the operators’ expectation that average 
revenue per user (ARPU) will increase many times over with the new opportuni-
ties available with 3G data capacity and new service possibilities. The cost for a 
new 3G network is a huge investment and not a simple upgrade from existing 
infrastructure, and equipment vendors have been forced, just as they were during 
the fi xed or mobile network expansion phase, to provide fi nancing to operators 
to get contracts.
In the 2G networks, operators have been providing primarily voice-centric ser-
vices, and new service development has been more or less the same thing as re-
vising and upgrading the network management system. The services offered have 
largely been developed jointly by operators and network equipment providers and 
openly standardized before being implemented. Because the network features are 
standardized to ensure interoperability, operators have had to continuously revise 
and upgrade so as not to fall behind their competitors. With 3G capabilities, 
operators see possibilities to differentiate themselves and offer unique services, 
which will require a service development dynamic that is different from the 2G 
paradigm. The dynamic between operators and network equipment suppliers will 
need to change, system integrators will have more freedom, and the established 
role of  open standards will also change.
The number of  customers that subscribe to a carrier’s services has been a mea-
sure of  success, and terminals have been heavily subsidized by the operators in 
efforts to rapidly gain control over the market. Prepaid cards have increased this 
even more, and the number of  subsidized phones has in some markets been as 
much as 80% of  the total number of  phones sold. Very little segmentation has 
been done, and all customers are treated equally, as measured by ARPU (aver-
age revenue per user). The lack of  segmentation makes introducing new services 
complicated because the group of  established subscribers that will be offered 
the services is not homogeneous. The new 3G services being explicitly aimed to 
differentiate product offerings might, because of  the earlier non-segmented ap-
proach, make the operators’ existing installed base of  users less useful.
4.6 Terminal
The terminal is the device in the hands of  the end user. It may be a cellular 
phone, a smart phone, a communicator, a personal digital assistant (PDA), or 
other device. The terminal business within the telecommunications industry is 
today highly concentrated and commoditized, and as margins erode, economies 
of  scale have proven to be a key to profi tability. Terminals were formerly an 
expanded product offering from network equipment suppliers but are now a con-
sumer product. Today terminals are distributed and sold almost solely via chan-
nels controlled by the operator. When the terminal is subsidized to the end user, 
it is locked to the network for a period of  time so that the operator reduces the 
churn rate–that is, the number of  subscribers that terminate their subscriptions 
with the operator. 
Just as with network upgrades, the possibility for terminal manufacturers to dif-
ferentiate their applications has been limited and strongly infl uenced by standard-
ized applications. Differentiation has instead been done on attributes such as 
design, color, battery performance, display, and simple proprietary games. For the 
end user, customization possibilities on the terminal now include exchangeable 
front covers, ring signals, and personal screensavers. 
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Just as the fi rst handheld 2G terminals pushed the extremes of  computing power 
and battery performance when they were fi rst introduced, the 3G terminals are 
expected to do the same. The new applications brought forward by application 
developers will have to be terminated in small computing devices as a client-serv-
er relationship. The applications are limited to what is possible to do on a minia-
turized terminal, and because of  this the range of  services is limited as well.
The most advanced terminals today have data capabilities such as CSD (cir-
cuit-switched data) or PSD (packet-switched data). They also have proprietary 
operating systems, and the applications that can run on them are limited to the 
applications provided by the terminal manufacturers themselves. There is no 
accessible open application environment that allows the user to change the ap-
plications running on a mobile phone or terminal, and because of  this there is no 
established developer community. This is changing and terminal manufactureres 
are opening up their application environment for outside developers in third-
party programs, and several of  the larger computer operating systems are making 
scaled-down versions of  their operating systems that should be able to function 
on a cell phone. 
Because of  the processor limitations on a mobile terminal and the availability 
of  access via CSD or PSD, there have been some attempts to promote divided 
concepts where the phone simply acts as a modem and connects to a PDA via 
infrared or Bluetooth. Many phones do, however, have simple messaging applica-
tions and browsers that make it possible to surf  the Web and thus access some 
services. So far these services have been largely unsuccessful according to user 
perception, though there are some noticeable exceptions such as BlackBerry in 
the United States, SMS in Europe, and i-mode in Japan.
The branding of  terminals is a way for terminal manufacturers to differenti-
ate themselves as well as attract customers and develop a loyal customer base. 
However, in many markets operators have forced the terminal manufacturer to 
remove its brand completely or to co-brand by including the operator’s brand as 
well.  Looking forward, for 3G services the branding issue is not resolved.
4.7 Integration in the value chain
For several reasons, some companies have been integrating horizontally in an 
attempt to control the whole value chain. Two that have done so recently are 
Vivendi Universal and AOL Time Warner. In the case of  the mobile Internet the 
primary reasons for control seem to be time to market and channel access. The 
time to market would be faster because technology choices could be harmonized 
in an early stage to avoid technology mismatch, and service concepts could be 
developed in parallel with the technology. Channel access is important because of  
the scarcity of  frequency spectrum; if  the content owner does not have an access 
channel, he cannot reach the end user.
Services on the Mobile Internet
29
5
30
5. BlackBerry in the USA
BlackBerry™ is a corporate service solution with 320,000 users in more than 
15,000 businesses and organizations mostly in North America, but BlackBerry 
has recently been introduced in Europe. BlackBerry accounts for 67.5 percent of  
the U.S. keypad device market, which totalled 519,000 units shipped in 2001; only 
4,000 units were shipped internationally.
Since it was introduced in 1999, BlackBerry has become entrenched in the 
enterprise market and is currently the corporate standard for wireless data com-
munications. Initially it was an e-mail solution, and although its functionality has 
expanded, e-mail is still considered the core functionality. The BlackBerry PDA 
is essentially a wireless e-mail and paging device. Its service is hugely popular 
among its users and has been described as “the i-mode of  North America.”3
BlackBerry was developed by the Canadian company Research in Motion, Ltd. 
(RIM), which designs, manufactures, and markets wireless solutions for the mo-
bile communications market. It is based in Waterloo, Ontario, and is listed on the 
NASDAQ Stock Exchange (NASDAQ: RIMM) and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE: RIM). It is no coincidence that much of  the BlackBerry functionality and 
service idea is brought from the pager industry, where RIM has been an impor-
tant RF (radio frequency) radio component supplier. Initially RIM bought airtime 
from the Mobitex network and called the service “distributed paging”; it was later 
renamed BlackBerry.4
Users are very positive about how easy and convenient the BlackBerry makes it to 
receive and send e-mails. It has also become something of  a status symbol among 
its users. Many have grown so addicted to the service that they call it Crackberry, 
or as Dennis Kavelman, CFO at RIM, described the BlackBerry user: “People 
that have BlackBerry use voice as their secondary way of  communicating.”
The fi rst two versions of  the BlackBerry, the pager-sized 950 and palm-sized 957, 
offered basic messaging capability: a 26-button keypad, an e-mail alert system, 
and the ability to download and install, for example, Microsoft Outlook and 
Lotus address books. At this writing in 2002, there are several handheld models 
priced between $399 and $499, the monthly subscription service is $39.99, and a 
multitude of  upgrades and service enhancements are available for purchase. The 
new BlackBerry 5810 launched in March 2002 adds voice, SMS, and GPRS and 
uses Java 2 Micro Edition as its core operating system. With the BlackBerry 5810, 
RIM also made a strategic announcement that the platform, both server and ter-
minal, will be open to outside developers. 
5.1 The company: Research in Motion (RIM)
Research in Motion was founded in 1984 by Michael Lazaridis and Douglas 
Fregin. Lazaridis and James Balsillie are co-chief  executive offi cers. The com-
pany started out as a developer, manufacturer, and worldwide original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) provider of  radio modem technology for the wireless mes-
saging personal communication service (PCS) industry. 
3 Interview by Om Malik with 
John Doerr, partner at Kleiner 
Perkins Caufi eld & Byers, Red 
Herring, December 5, 2000.
4 James Balsillie, May 21, 
2002.
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Due to heavy product development and market expansion, RIM reported a net 
loss of  $28.5 million for the fi scal year that ended in March 2002, more than four 
times higher than the $6.2 million loss a year earlier and the net income of  $10.5 
million in fi scal year 2000. However, the company’s revenue keeps growing. For 
the fi scal year that ended in March, revenues reached $294.1 million, an increase 
of  33 percent from the previous year. RIM expects revenues between $375 mil-
lion and $425 million in the fi scal year that ends in 2003. The fi rm has approxi-
mately 1,400 employees and cash assets of  over $672.9 million. Even though 
revenues are increasing, there is a noticeable decline in the stock that is partially 
due to the overall declining market.
BlackBerry accounted for 54% of  RIM’s total revenue in 2001; other RIM wire-
less handhelds accounted for 37% of  revenues during the same period.  The 
remaining 9% of  revenue consisted of  sales of  OEM radio modems, software 
licenses, non-recurring engineering (NRE) development charges, and wireless PC 
cards. The results of  2002 suggest that revenues from BlackBerry will account 
for an increasing amount of  RIM’s revenues; for the second quarter of  2002, the 
BlackBerry solution accounted for approximately 68% of  revenues.   
5.2 The service
With e-mail being the ultimate horizontal application, RIM addresses several ver-
tical markets with BlackBerry.5 There is no predominant vertical industry using 
BlackBerry today; the fi nancial market constitutes 20% of  the subscriber base. 
Some other vertical industry segments represented among BlackBerry users are 
law, government, technology, oil and gas, and entertainment. To BlackBerry’s ad-
vantage is the fact that the enterprise business segment today is striving towards 
corporate standard environments, for cost reasons, and wants one e-mail system 
and one wireless system.6 
Perhaps one of  the biggest challenges facing today’s corporate mobile profession-
als is staying connected to their desktop e-mail and organizer information such 
as contacts, calendar, tasks, and memos while out of  the offi ce.  Presently, the 
laptop, cell phones, and wireless PDAs are common solutions for responding to 
e-mail while on the road.
There are several problems with each of  these solutions.  First, there is the in-
convenience of  carrying a cumbersome laptop around just for e-mail.  Second, 
there is the trouble of  fi nding a connection.  Third, there is the diffi culty negoti-
ating corporate dial-in security.  Fourth, there is the cost of  phone charges when 
dialing into the corporate server from remote locations and hotels.  Information 
technology (IT) managers were also not satisfi ed with the laptop solution because 
of  the challenge of  managing modem banks and the vulnerability of  opening a 
path into the corporate network.7 Also, keypads on cell phones are awkward for 
typing messages, and the display screens are generally small.  Supporting dial-up 
PDAs is considered too risky because of  the lack of  security software available 
for PDAs.
5 Dennis Kavelman, May 15, 
2002.
6 James Balsillie, May 21, 
2002.
7 James Balsillie, May 21, 2002
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The BlackBerry device, RIM’s premier product, is the front end of  the complete 
service offered by RIM and what the user interacts with. The BlackBerry is a 
wireless e-mail pager that incorporates PDA functionality.  Unlike a pager or a 
PDA, it also provides seamless always-on connection to the user’s e-mail accounts 
and allows its user to receive and send e-mails in real time. The latest device 
from RIM is the BlackBerry 5810 (Figure 8). Although there have been changes 
from the earlier device presented in 1999, the core functionality is the same. The 
BlackBerry service solution has several features that build up the attractive offer 
it presents. According to James Balsillie, the BlackBerry with these features pro-
vides “high value per bit.”
Figure 8: BlackBerry 5810
BlackBerry is designed to remain on and continuously connected to the wireless 
network so that the user does not have to constantly check for new incoming 
e-mails. In other words, it has “push” functionality: the e-mail fi nds the user. To 
emphasize this, RIM has trademarked the slogan “Always On, Always Connected.” 
The difference between “push” and “pull” functionality is that with push function-
ality the user does not have to make a conscious choice to connect to the network, 
but receives the message in real time. RIM considers the push functionality to be 
the key factor in BlackBerry’s success.8 BlackBerry incorporates a wireless exten-
sion of  the user’s corporate mailbox, using his or her existing e-mail address.  RIM 
also supplies server and desktop software that allow for further integration of  
BlackBerry into existing corporate e-mail systems and provides the software and 
hardware solution for carriers to communicate with the BlackBerry.
Since companies are expected to put the BlackBerry solution inside their fi rewall, a 
secure wireless end-to-end synchronized push connection is necessary. BlackBerry 
provides a completely secure solution between the corporate e-mail system and the 
handheld device.  BlackBerry uses a U.S.-government-created encryption system 
that is used by the banking industry to protect sensitive transactions. RIM uses sev-
eral strategic reference customers such as the National Security Agency (NSA), the 
U.S. government, the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, the White House, and the Navy 
to emphasize and validate this.
 RIM has focused on user friendliness from the beginning. If  the user can use e-
mail, he or she can use BlackBerry. BlackBerry has a user-friendly thumb-operated 
QWERTY keyboard and a track wheel (see Figure 8).  There is no modem to at-
tach, number to dial in, or antenna to raise. Further, the service works immediately 
for the end user without a cumbersome installation process.
Besides real-time synchronized e-mails, BlackBerry also provides continuously con-
nected PDA-like personal information management (PIM) functionality that allows 
organizer information such as contacts, calendar, tasks, and memos to be wire-
lessly synchronized with the user’s desktop.  Having established a partnership with 
Hewlett-Packard, BlackBerry is now capable of  mobile network printing as well.
8 James Balsillie, May 21, 
2002.
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BlackBerry is compatible with platforms such as J2ME™ (Java™ 2, Micro Edition), 
and the KVM (K-Java Virtual Machine), which allow third-party solutions to 
integrate with built-in BlackBerry applications. BlackBerry will also be able to run 
on the General Packet Radio Services (GPRS) standard and support GPRS and 
future 3G standards such as Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCD-
MA) or the similar standard WCDMA2000.  In the latest product, the 5810, voice 
functionality has been added to the BlackBerry device through the use of  an ear-
phone. Voice is a product expansion of  the messaging functionality that is core to 
BlackBerry users.
Selling the BlackBerry service is a multilevel sale that involves the end user, the 
chief  information offi cer (CIO) at the company targeted, the system integrator, 
and the operator.9 Until today RIM has primarily addressed the end user and the 
CIO with a service offering, but the systems integrator and the operators will be 
more important in the future. The system integrator will build on the new open 
BlackBerry platform and create solutions where BlackBerry will be the enabling 
mobile channel in the service integrator’s offering.10 With the new strategy the 
operator will be the interface to the corporate customer. RIM wants to catalyze 
the carrier’s strategic partnership with the enterprise business and system integra-
tor. The payment for the service will also be handled by the operator rather than 
by RIM as before. The message that James Balsillie communicated in May 2002 
was, “One device, one bill, and one carrier.”
To execute this new strategy RIM has a dedicated sales team that provides sup-
port and training to the operators’ corporate customer. The operator can also 
benefi t from the already established relationship between RIM and the corporate 
data department.
5.3 The technology
From the beginning, RIM build up core competence around the design and 
manufacture of  compact and energy-effi cient wireless data communication prod-
ucts. This included competence around radio frequency engineering, electronics 
design, low-level software development (fi rmware), and product development 
processes. RIM has sales representation in Europe as well as in Asia, but R&D 
and manufacturing are located in Canada. Initially the manufacturing was out-
sourced, but in 1996 RIM build its own manufacturing facility, aiming to improve 
yield, product quality, and time to market. With the current production level and 
because of  the complexity of  new products constantly being introduced, out-
sourcing is not an option, but there could be a point where outsourcing would 
prove effi cient.11
In May 2002, RIM held 39 patents covering various aspects of  its technology 
achievements within transceivers and power management in miniature devices.12 
All BlackBerry devices are built with RIM’s own internally developed chipset. 
RIM has also entered into several licensing agreements to be able to use other 
companies’ technologies.13 Two recent press releases June 19 2002 and September 
18 2002 suggest that RIM is actively monitoring and pursuing patent infringe-
ments.
9 James Balsillie, May 21, 
2002.
10 James Balsillie, May 21, 
2002.
11 Dennis Kavelman, May 15, 
2002.
12 www.uspto.gov.
13 Dennis Kavelman, May 15, 
2002.
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Initially the BlackBerry service used the Mobitex packet-switched, narrowband 
PCS network, which is designed for wide-area wireless data communications. 
The Mobitex networks in North America are operated by Cingular Interactive in 
the United States and Rogers™ AT&T® Wireless in Canada. Cingular’s wireless 
nationwide Mobitex packet data network provides coverage in 260 metropolitan 
areas in the United States. The choice to use the Mobitex network was an early and 
critical technology choice made by RIM because, for example, it allows the user to 
have an e-mail instantly pushed. The same push functionality is possible with the 
packet-switched GPRS technology (2.5G) that is being introduced globally, and 
RIM has chosen to let the new BlackBerry 5810 (5820 in Europe) support only 
GPRS. In the United States, AT&T Wireless and VoiceStream Wireless operate 
GPRS networks; in Canada, Rogers AT&T Wireless runs a GPRS network.
5.4 Alliances
Alliances are increasingly important for RIM to be able to develop both their mar-
ket and their product and services. Three types of  alliances are the most common: 
alliances with business SW suppliers, with system integrators, and with operators. 
But it has also had alliances with computer manufacturers, such as Compaq. RIM 
has on occasion used these alliances for U.S. national targeted advertising and co-
branding campaigns.
To develop and deliver a wide range of  wireless enterprise solutions, RIM is build-
ing alliances with business SW suppliers such as Microsoft, Lotus Notes, Oracle, 
Sun Microsystems, BEA, Computer Associates, NetIQ, Compaq, Hewlett-Pack-
ard, Xerox, Siebel, and SAP. This is a highly concentrated market with few compa-
nies, and there is not a big difference between the PIM systems from RIM’s point 
of  view.14 
RIM encourages system integrators to develop vertical applications for specifi c 
industries, such as law, fi nance, and health care. In addition, RIM has created a ref-
erence design program to provide device manufacturers with the technology and 
tools needed to easily develop and deliver devices based on embedded BlackBerry 
and Java technologies. The alliances with system integrators (SIs) are in many cases 
the same as for the business SW suppliers as well as for fi rms such as IBM Global 
Services and several of  the major global consulting companies. 
Alliances with operators such as VoiceStream, AT&T, Nextel, Cingular in the U.S., 
and several others in Europe and Asia constitute a critical part of  the RIM part-
nering strategy. Initially, RIM bought airtime from the Mobitex network and sold 
the airtime as part of  the service directly to companies. To reach a larger customer 
base, strategic partnerships with operators have been formed where RIM is offer-
ing the BlackBerry service through operators, mainly to corporate customers. It 
is important to have alliances with many operators because corporations that use 
BlackBerry require a multitude of  networks within a country and also a geographic 
spread because of  the global environment they are working in.
By recently presenting a BlackBerry solution based on Java, RIM has made the 
service hardware and software transparent—in other words, agnostic as to what 
handset it is presented on as long as it supports Java. As more and more handsets 
are supporting Java in combination with new possibilities for operators to provide 
applications over the air, RIM hopes that BlackBerry will be able to reach and ad-
dress a substantially larger customer base. 
14 Dennis Kavelman, May 15, 
2002.
Services on the Mobile Internet
35
According to James Balsillie, RIM’s offering to operators has three important 
components. First, the BlackBerry is a total service solution, not a single device 
or a piece of  software or stand-alone application. Second, RIM brings to the op-
erator a market that is already developed and established. Finally, RIM can offer 
operators its expertise in customer care, technical presales, channel development, 
and sales in an environment that is new for operators. RIM can also achieve 
economies of  scale because there are many similarities among operators.
5.5 International expansion
Many of  the companies that have BlackBerry solutions are multinational com-
panies that demand a homogeneous IT solution to keep maintenance costs low. 
The same applies for the alliances that RIM is forming with business SW suppli-
ers, SIs, and carriers. The companies in these alliances are also working in a global 
environment. 
Originally it operated only in North America, but during summer 2002 the 
service was rolled out in Europe. BlackBerry is currently available in the United 
States., Canada, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Hong 
Kong, with additional plans announced in 2002 for Australia, Macau, and Main-
land China. So far the only language provided is English, but as markets open up 
other languages will be available.15
In the UK, RIM announced that Vodaphone would be delivering the BlackBerry 
solution. Previously in the UK, MOM2 was the only carrier that had announced 
plans to deliver a BlackBerry solution. Hutchison will deliver Blackberry in Hong 
Kong. In Italy, Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) will provide BlackBerry, with Lotus 
Notes and Microsoft Exchange, in addition to the i-mode offering together with 
NTT DoCoMo. The trials with TIM have so far shown that the BlackBerry ser-
vice is received positively and with the same reactions as in the United States.16 
5.6 Competition
Like many other small but growing companies, BlackBerry will soon appear on 
large companies’ radar screens. There are products on the market that are similar 
to RIM’s BlackBerry device, but few that provide the complete service offering. 
Many of  the larger mobile phone manufacturers such as Nokia and Motorola 
also have a variety of  models with more or less accentuated PIM solutions, but 
not in combination with the total service solution. Two examples that are close 
to substitutes are Handspring’s TREO based on the Palm operating system, and 
Danger, which is releasing an end-to-end mobile applications platform in sum-
mer 2002 that includes a back-end service.
15 Dennis Kavelman, May 15, 
2002.
16 Dennis Kavelman, May 15, 
2002.
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6. i-mode in Japan
On February 22, 1999, the Japanese wireless operator DoCoMo launched a ser-
vice called i-mode, which takes the standard voice-centric phone and adds Inter-
net access, messaging, and data capabilities into an ordinary cellular phone. 
The initial i-mode service offering was access to e-mail and a few simple homep-
ages. However, this fi lled a big need in Japan, where Internet access was not as 
common as in the United States or Europe. At the end of  1998, Internet penetra-
tion in Japan was below 10%,17 as compared to 25%in the United States18  and 
18% in Europe. 
i-mode was especially attractive to a young Japanese generation that wanted to 
communicate with friends. Girls in particular embraced i-mode quickly and soon 
could be seen typing messages everywhere, especially in the subway. There in 
the crowded trains, Japanese commuters, who spend two to three hours a day on 
public transportation, also picked up i-mode. Laptops are too bulky to use on 
the trains, and it’s even hard to read a newspaper, but they can use their i-mode 
phone to access the Internet, send e-mails, and get news and business-related 
information.19 
The success was immediate. The new service had more than a million subscrib-
ers within six months, and by the end of  2001 there where no fewer than 22 
million subscribers. These fi gures astonished the telecom people in Europe and 
the U.S., whose initial skepticism turned to open admiration when i-mode started 
to take off:  “The more users i-mode gets, the more content will be created, and 
the more content that is created, the more users i-mode gets. It’s a positive spiral 
where DoCoMo is the enabler making sure that everything is working.”20 And as 
Kei-ichi Enoki put it: “We have successfully introduced the positive “feedback 
spiral” process of  the Internet into the wireless world.”21
DoCoMo not only worked with handset manufacturers to create an attractive cell 
phone according to its own specifi cation, but it also presented an attractive busi-
ness model for content providers that enabled them to design profi table services 
for an increasing base of  customers. 
6.1 The company: DoCoMo
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) was established in 
1952 using the American telecommunication company AT&T as a model. NTT 
remained a monopoly until 1985, when it was partly privatized into Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Corporation. NTT Mobile Communications Network Inc, 
containing the wireless activity within NTT, was spun off  in 1992.
In 1995, NTT was fully privatized as a publicly owned corporation, and at the 
same time new common carriers (NCCs) were allowed to enter the Japanese 
telecom market. The NCCs did fi nd their niche, but competition did not really 
take off  until Japan enforced the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements 
in 1998. As a result, NTT was broken up into smaller pieces so that competi-
tion would be fair and reasonable for all carriers. However, some still believe that 
NTT is too dominant in several areas.
17
http://www.asiabiztech.com
18 U.S. Government, Bureau 
of  the Census.
19 Toshimitsu Kawano, April 
26, 2001.
20 Norihiko Hiros, December 
12, 2002.
21 Enoki Kei-ichi, October 4, 
2000.
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Initially DoCoMo struggled with the new cellular technology, and the industry 
moved slowly, mainly because of  high subscription prices. From an internal NTT 
engineering perspective, DoCoMo was the “black sheep” and clearly not the fi rst 
choice in the early 1990s. This changed, though, and in 1998, DoCoMo was the 
most profi table unit within the NTT group, generating more than 50% of  the 
total profi t through its cellular phone service.
The fi rst year that fi xed telephony declined in Japan was 1997, at the same time 
that the wireless market was booming. The yearly growth of  wireless subscribers 
was around 20%, and in March 2000 the number of  wireless subscribers sur-
passed the number of  fi xed phone subscribers. DoCoMo clearly has the domi-
nant position (2002), with a 53% market share of  the $50 billion Japanese mobile 
cellular services market.
6.2 The service
In the second half  of  1996, the consulting company McKinsey provided DoCo-
Mo CEO Kouji Ohboshi with a report on how DoCoMo could extend its servic-
es beyond voice services to data communication. Ohboshi decided to go ahead, 
and in the beginning of  1997 the electrical engineer Kei-ichi Enoki, together with 
Mari Matsunaga, editor for a classifi ed advertising magazine, and Takeshi Nat-
suno, founder of  several Internet start-ups, started to recruit a team. They began 
putting it together in early 1997, recruiting a cross-functional and by Japanese 
standards untraditional team (see Figure 9), a strategy that proved successful.
Figure 9: Cross-functional 
recruiting in the 
i-mode project team 
(Kei-ichi Enoki, 
2000)
Second half  of  1996 Consultant’s report
End of  1996 CEO Decision to start I-mode project
Early 1997 CEO order Kei-ichi Enoki to start project
Spring 1997 Team recruitment
Spring 1997– Strategy-making; concepts and business
Fall 1997– Product development; content, terminals, 
network
Fall 1998– Sales promotion
February 1999 Launch i-mode service
February 1999– New services begin
Table 4: Development pro-
cess of  i-mode (Kei-
ichi Enoki, 2000)
During 1997 the concept, business model, and development process were 
formed, including specifi cations work on terminals, network, and interfaces for 
content providers (see Table 4).
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Figure 10: i-mode revenue and 
content fl ow: the 
“virtuous circle”
Specifi cations need to be detailed and technical and are written mainly by en-
gineers. In the area of  providing user-friendliness, Ms. Matsunaga was a non-
technical member of  the team who provided a clear vision of  what non-techni-
cal people would want. Her two main contributions to i-mode were to provide 
exceptional ease of  use and to develop the business model that has proven very 
effective in attracting value-added content and service providers (Vincent, 2001).
Traditionally telecommunications have only two players in the value chain: the 
subscriber and the service provider. However, DoCoMo successfully tailored 
i-mode to encompass the content provider and clearly position itself  in the 
value chain of  this three-way relationship. DoCoMo describes the i-mode busi-
ness model as a “virtuous circle” (see Figure 10), and DoCOMo relies heavily on 
positive feedback cycles that drive a virtuous circle of  re-investment in successful 
content and provide an increase in value to the end user.
SubscriberDoCoMo
Information
provider
Commission fee
Information
and
Content
Information
charges
Monthly charges
Packet transmission charges
Information charges
The position taken by DoCoMo early on was to not be a content or information 
provider. This, together with the fact that the content provider clearly understood 
DoCoMo’s business model, has clearly contributed to the successful relationship. 
By controlling the distribution channel to the millions of  i-mode phones, DoCo-
Mo is in a favorable position to negotiate terms with the content owners. How-
ever, DoCoMo provides such an attractive offer that content owners are waiting 
in line for access to DoCoMo’s preferred list.
6.3 The technology
A technology enabler for i-mode was NTT’s proprietary packet technology 
PDC-P, which was introduced as the pager service DoPa in 1997. The PDC-P 
technology could be compared to Mobitex packet-switched in the United States, 
introduced in 1996, and to GPRS, which was rolled out and introduced in the UK 
in the middle of  2001. DoPa was not an immediate success but taught DoCoMo 
a great deal about the packet-based technology and services in the non-voice 
market. It was not until DoCoMo decided to launch i-mode services based on the 
packet technology PDC-P that customer usage exploded. 
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The fi rst assumption was that PDC-P, which only allows for 9.6 K bit/sec com-
pared to GPRS speeds up to 56 K bit/sec, would provide insuffi cient bandwidth 
for consumers, but the rapid adoption of  the i-mode service proved this assump-
tion to be completely wrong.
There are three main reasons why the bandwidth provided a satisfactory user 
experience. DoCoMo realized that it needed a maximum size on a homepage 
(5 KB) as well as on e-mail (0.5 KB); it introduced a markup language, compact 
html (c-html); and it realized that small screens do not need a lot of  information. 
Looking back, these early technology decisions were critical, though they seem 
obvious today. 
C-html is simply a subset of  html, which is the language used on all homepages 
on the Internet. The choice of  c-html was not obvious elsewhere, as in Europe 
and the United States, where WAP was being developed and heavily promoted 
by operators as well as technology providers. Although it did not demand more 
bandwidth, WAP was far more complicated from a developer’s point of  view, and 
satisfying developers was a crucial feature of  DoCoMo’s business model. DoCo-
Mo also provides a set of  proprietary APIs (application program interfaces) that 
the service developer uses to tailor the service to fi t the DoCoMo service. Al-
though the i-mode technology is proprietary, DoCoMo holds only a few patents 
around the technology and claims that it is more or less an open standard.22  
There are two other unique aspects that were inherited from the PDC-P but still 
instrumental to the success of  i-mode: “always on” and “pay-per-bit.” “Always 
on” means that voice and data are separated and can be used in parallel, in con-
trast to the CSD (circuit-switched data) solution initially used for WAP, where the 
user dials a number and then establishes a data connection. The advantage with 
packet-switched data (PSD) is that the phone is not busy when using data servic-
es, the connection time is much faster, and e-mails are showed instantly. “Pay-per-
bit” allowed DoCoMo to charge for the data transmitted and received.
DoCoMo has a very strong and dominating relationship with the handset manu-
facturers and provides them with clear and detailed specifi cations for what 
functionality a handset should have to be able to be sold as a DoCoMo branded 
handset. The ability to write good specifi cations is a legacy of  NTT’s strong back-
ground in writing detailed specifi cations for technology providers.
22 N. Hirose, interview, 
December 12, 2002.
Figure 11: Selection of   503 
Java-enabled i-mode 
phones
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The phone manufacturers are free to decide on design (see Figure 11) and fea-
tures as long as they follow DoCoMo’s technical specifi cations. From a branding 
perspective, the difference between a DoCoMo 503 and a 503 from a differ-
ent manufacturer is that a NEC phone is called N503, a Panasonic P503, and a 
Fujitsu F503. Every new phone generation with increasingly advanced features is 
massively promoted by DoCoMo, and the different phone generations are called 
501, 502, 503, and 504 (see Table 5). The transition from phase-in to phase-out 
in the lifecycle of  a phone model tends to be short. DoCoMo is subsidizing new 
phone models to consumers to speed up the adoption of  i-mode, but also to 
make consumers more willing to switch from an old model to a newer one, thus 
being able to sell more services.
i-mode name Main Feature
501i The fi rst i-mode terminal
502i Part color liquid crystal, arrival of  the melody download 
function and wallpaper modifi cation function.
503i Java loading SSL
504i (due Q1/2 2002) Java program size 30K bytes. Transmission 
speed 28.8 K bit/sec (expectation)
Table 5: History of  i-mode 
handset capabilities
6.4 Alliances
Besides technology relationships, DoCoMo has started to build new and impor-
tant alliances with content providers. DoCoMo also segmented its content pro-
viders early on to build up a diversifi ed content portfolio that would add value for 
i-mode users. The four categories that DoCoMo used to classify content were: 
transaction, information, data base, and entertainment (see Figure 12).
Figure 12: i-mode content 
portfolio (Kei-ichi 
Enoki, 2000)
DoCoMo collects two types of  fees from the subscriber: (1) the packet trans-
mission fee that is based on the volume of  bits carried, and (2) the monthly 
subscription and information fee. The charges for these value-added services are 
added to the subscriber’s monthly bill, and DoCoMo acts as a payment broker 
between the subscriber and the content or information provider. The content 
provider pays a commission to DoCoMo for this service. 
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In return for this commission, DoCoMo also provides the basic service frame-
work, the navigation facilities (directory service), and the active promotion of  
i-mode in Japan. With the potential to reach 38 million i-mode subscribers, the 
content providers are lining up for an appointment with DoCoMo, and there is a 
3-month wait for even an initial meeting. 
The price to subscribe to a value-added service is around ¥100–¥300 ($0.70–
$2.50) per month (see Table 6), and from this DoCoMo takes around 10%; the 
rest goes directly to the content providers. The basic i-mode subscription is 
¥300 ($2.50) per month, to which the customer has to add the packet transmis-
sion charges of  ¥0•3/packet ($0.002) (1 packet = 128 bytes). The costs for some 
common transactions are approximately: ¥3 ($0.02) for downloading a menu; 
¥8 ($0.07) an image, and ¥3 ($0.02) for a music clip. The cost to check one’s 
bank balance is ¥20 ($0.17), and the cost to check the current packet transmis-
sion charges is ¥6 ($0.05). The rates are considered reasonable by the Japanese, 
and when multiplied by 38 million subscribers the revenue adds up to a profi table 
business for DoCoMo and for the content providers. 
Service name Information provider Description Subscription fee per 
month
Weathernews Weather news Daily and weekly forecasts Free
CNN CNN 24 hours news and 
information
¥300($2.50)
Asahi Shimbun The Asahi Shimbun News ¥100($0.70)
People’s Daily People’s Daily Chinese news Free
Nikkei News Nihon Keizai Nikkei English Free
Bloomberg Bloomberg LP News, market data, stock 
quotes, personal watch list
¥300($2.50)
Dow Jones Dow Jones Global fi nancial news ¥300($2.50)
TMTDW Tokyo-Mitshubishi 
TD Waterhouse
Latest fi nancial market 
news; U.S. equity trading 
services
Free
Disney-i Disney Disney character, ring 
tones, games, and info
¥100($0.70)
Pokemolo JOY XING Ring tones ¥300($2.50)
Miracle GP Hudson Car game ¥300($2.50)
Imahima! ImaHima, Inc Check the status of  
friends, contact and plan 
things; create personal 
pages
¥100($0.70)
Cooking Japan Osaka gas Recipes and cooking hints Free
TokyoFoodPage NokiaJapan Guide to eating and 
dining
Free
i-townpage NTT Yellow pages (English) Free
Fedex Federal Express Track the status of  your 
package
Free
Table 6: Selection of  i-mode 
services
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6.5 International expansion
DoCoMo is using its experience in implementing i-mode to license its technol-
ogy in an attempt to expand internationally, primarily to Europe and the United 
States.
In Europe, DoCoMo has announced agreements with several operators that will 
provide access to 20.3 million users (see Table 7). The two main contributions 
from DoCoMo to the collaborations are technology and know-how around the 
i-mode service offering. However, the underlying packet network used will be 
GPRS, which has been rolled out widely in Europe. 
The fi rst European collaboration agreement was signed in May 2000 between 
DoCoMo and KPN Mobile. DoCoMo paid almost $4 million for 15% of  the 
company and became a minority stakeholder; KPN will license the i-mode busi-
ness model from DoCoMo.  
Getting access to the market through KPN also enables DoCoMo to access the 
market of  E-plus. E-Plus is the third largest operator in Germany, and its share-
holders are KPN Mobile N.V. with 77.49% and the BellSouth Corp. with 22.51%. 
BellSouth exchanged its shares in E-Plus for ordinary shares in Royal KPN N.V. 
in the second quarter of  2002, after which E-Plus will be fully owned by the 
KPN group. In the collaboration with the smallest French operator, Bouygues, 
there has been no capital investment by DoCoMo.
Country Operator Launch date Subscribers (million) / (%)
Germany E-Plus March 02 7.5 (13%)
Netherlands KPN Mobile N.V. April 02 5.2 (42%)
Belgium KPN Mobile N.V. June 02 1.0 (12%)
France Bouygues Late 2002 6.6 (18%)
UK Hutch3GUK Late 2002 0 (3G only)
Total 20.3
Table 7: i-mode European 
expansion
Source: NTT DoCoMo 
(9437) Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein.
The fi rst i-mode-enabled GPRS handsets in Europe are from NEC (NEC N21i) 
and almost identical to their Japanese counterparts. This is an opportunity for 
NEC as a handset manufacturer to enter the European market, where it has only 
a 3% market share. In Japan NEC is the leading supplier to DoCoMo and the 
largest handset manufacturer in Japan.
In an attempt to enter the U.S. market, DoCoMo paid $9.8 billion, in January 
2001, for 16% of  the U.S. telecommunication company AT&T Wireless. Due to 
the strategic alliance with NTT DoCoMo, in April 2001 AT&T decided to divest 
its 10% ownership in Japan Telecom, which is owned by the Vodaphone group. 
In the agreement between AT&T and DoCoMo, there is a provision that restricts 
AT&T future operations and provisions that may require AT&T to repurchase 
DoCoMo’s interest in AT&T, if  certain specifi ed conditions are not met.
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6.6 Competition
The GSM Association, representing operators and manufacturers using Europe’s 
prevailing mobile technology, in 2001 revealed their answer to i-mode, called m-
services. The m-services initiative set standards designed to increase the use of  
wireless Internet services. The standard has not been adopted by anyone other 
than Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM), but the association plans future revisions. 
The primary goal of  the industry association WAP Forum is to bring together 
companies from all segments of  the wireless industry value chain to ensure 
product interoperability and growth of  the wireless market. Most of  the global 
handset manufacturers (90%), carriers with approximately 650 million subscrib-
ers, and infrastructure providers have chosen to work with WAP within the WAP 
Forum. NTT DoCoMo is also a member. 
WAP addresses only the technical feasibility and not the business model, which is 
up to the service provider to establish. The WAP standard was heavily promoted 
at the time that i-mode was introduced, but the expectations raised were not 
met. The combination of  hype and miscommunication generated a discrepancy 
between expectations and what can be done. WAP did not meet initial end-user 
expectations, as Robert Brown, chief  executive of  the WAP Forum, stated in an 
interview: “I wasn’t impressed with the fi rst versions of  WAP. It was tough to 
use.”23  However, the WAP Forum is continuously working on the standard, and 
the current release is supposed to incorporate c-html. 
Microsoft is trying to establish itself  as a player in the wireless sphere both with 
operating systems that can run on a small footprint such as a cell phone and on 
the server side as a technology provider to operators. Samsung has announced 
a phone with Microsoft Mobile Explorer 3.0 with support for html, c-html, and 
WAP 2.0. So far there has been little interest among operators in working with 
Microsoft; they see Microsoft’s move into services as a potential threat. Although 
there are some Microsoft-enabled phones with GPRS on the market, the installed 
base has not reached the critical mass needed for developers and content provid-
ers to start developing services. 
In Japan, DoCoMo faces competition from two other operators, KDDI and 
J-Phone (part of  Vodaphone group), which have launched services similar to 
i-mode’s but with different proprietary technology. KDDI operates fi ve cellular 
networks comprising two cdmaOne networks, two PDC networks, and one PHS 
network. Japan Telecom operates two PDC networks, one being the former Digi-
tal TU-KA brand. Astel competes with DDI Pocket and NTT DoCoMo Personal 
in the PHS market. 
The overall dominant position of  NTT DoCoMo has not discouraged KDDI 
and Japan Telecom because they are designing and conducting tests for 3G 
cellular services. The initial response to the 3G network launch in Japan is that 
DoCoMo is not growing as fast as expected and losing share of  the market to 
KDDI and J-Telecom. 
23 Robert Brown, Reuters, 
November 15, 2001.
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7. SMS in Europe
The fi rst short message is believed to have been sent in December 1992 from a 
PC to a mobile phone on the Vodafone GSM network in Newberry in the UK. 
Three years later, in 1995, Short Message Service (SMS) was being introduced as 
a service for commercial use. In September 1999, SMS use exceeded 100 million 
messages per month, and in August 2001 SMS traffi c reached 1 billion a month 
in Europe. SMS is the dominant data contributor to carriers’ average revenue per 
user (ARPU) and accounts for approximately 10% of  total revenues. Person-to-
person (P2P) messaging is the most popular form of  SMS at present, accounting 
for 95 percent of  total text messaging traffi c.
SMS is one of  the few services that have grown very fast without correspond-
ing decreases in pricing. Usually price reductions in the cost of  the phones and 
phone service have led to increases in usage. Even as these factors have helped to 
bring younger people into the mobile market, the price of  SMS itself  has stayed 
steady because the networks have had trouble handling the volume of  messages 
being sent.
The accidental success of  the SMS revolution took the whole mobile industry by 
surprise. There was hardly any promotion by operators until after SMS appeared 
on its way to becoming a winner. Then SMS advertising went from showing 
businesspeople in suits entering text messages to brightly colored advertisements 
aimed at youth markets. According to Jim Healy, chairman of  the GSM associa-
tion, “What was relatively a cult following just a couple of  years ago is a mass-
market phenomenon today.”
Initially, SMS was very diffi cult to use because of  the complicated man-machine 
interface.. Because the entry barriers to learning how to use the service were so 
high meant that parents, teachers, and other adult authority fi gures were unable 
and unwilling to use the service.24  But the young generation overcame this to 
become the SMS or text generation.
7.1 The standard: SMS
The infrastructure that is used to send an SMS and to make a regular mobile 
phone call in Europe is called Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM). GSM is the dominant non-proprietary mobile standard in Europe and is 
jointly developed by operators and equipment manufacturers within the frame-
work of  the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).25 GSM 
has been largely successful in Europe, but also in many other places around the 
world. In March 2002 there were 400 GSM operators with 677 million customers 
(71% of  the total digital wireless market) in 178 countries. The top 12 markets in 
Europe sent almost a billion SMS’s per month in the beginning of  2002, and this 
number is still increasing. The GSM penetration is 69% in the same market (see 
Table 8).
24 http://www.mobilesms.com
25 http://www.etsi.org
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Country Population (million) GSM subscribers 
(million)/%
SMS messages per 
month (million)
Germany 82.2 55/67 200
Italy 57.8 47/81 150
Finland 5.2 4/77 75
UK 60 43.4/72 70
Norway 4.5 3.3/73 70
Sweden 8.9 6.7/75 70
Portugal 10 7.5/75 60
France 59.2 33.7/57 60
Spain 39.8 26.8/67 60
Denmark 5.4 3.9/72 50
Belgium 10.3 7/68 25
Greece 10.9 7/64 15
TOTAL 354,2 245,3/69 1 Billion
Table 8: Top SMS volumes 
in the European 
market, 2001
The introduction of  SMS in Europe led by Vodafone and the other UK opera-
tors was immediately followed by most of  the other European operators. The 
UK was infl uential in the introduction of  SMS and its ongoing development; Ta-
ble 9 shows some of  the milestones. Besides the fact that all European operators 
are part of  the GSM family and use the GSM standard, there are some factors 
that have been instrumental in the success of  SMS, namely prepaid subscriptions, 
new services, improved devices, and Internetworking.
December 1992 The fi rst short message is sent in from a PC to a mobile phone on the 
Vodafone GSM network in Newberry in the UK
January 1995 SMS messaging introduced on mobile networks for commercial use
January 1999 Inter-carrier SMS enabled in the UK (40 million SMS messages 
recorded)
September 1999 SMS usage exceeds 100 million messages per month
May 2000 SMS traffi c hits half  a billion a month
June 2001 BBC airs a 45-minute documentary dedicated to SMS
August 2001 SMS traffi c hits 1 billion a month
2002 43 million texts sent every day; 1 billion per month
Table 9: Short SMS timeline 
with a UK focus
7.2 The service
The introduction of  heavily subsidized prepaid mobile tariffs in which people 
could pay for their airtime in advance and thereby control their mobile phone 
expenditures was a key factor that accelerated the acceptance of  SMS. Initially the 
network operators were technically unable to pre-bill customers for their SMS us-
age because the links between the prepay platform and the billing system and the 
SMS centers were not in place.
A problem for the operators was that the prepay phones supported the SMS 
service, and this loophole soon spread through the Internet and word of  mouth 
to many youngsters. This resulted in additional millions of  SMS messages being 
sent, with some individual mobile phone subscriptions accounting for thousands 
of  SMS’s per month alone as they set up automated message generators. 
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Network operators worked with their infrastructure suppliers to sort this out and 
to begin charging for SMS for prepaying customers. Meanwhile SMS incubated 
and spread because it cost people nothing to use, whereas carrying out the same 
transaction using voice clearly did cost. After a few months, the network operators 
fi nally managed to implement a way of  charging for SMS use by deducting the the 
cost of  an SMS message from the prepayment.
A mass SMS message distribution campaign was typically sent out at this time so 
that everyone who had used SMS received a text message informing them that 
from a certain date forward there would be a fee for SMS. This led to an immedi-
ate decline of  25–40% in SMS usage.  However, within months the volume of  
SMS messages increased again and soon reached its previous levels. 
The growth in SMS volume was fueled by simple person-to-person messaging 
(P2P) as people told each other how they were feeling and what they were doing. 
While it was free, SMS had become an important part of  the way that young peo-
ple communicated with each other in their daily lives. SMS would have taken off  
without the prepayment factor because it was already being used before that time, 
but it would not have taken off  as quickly.
Even though all SMS functionality is standardized and described in the GSM 
standard, the freedom to design and implement features is up to the manufacturer. 
Nokia, the leader in mobile phones, realized early on that SMS messaging was a 
source of  revenue for the operator and was fi rst to market with a phone able to 
send SMS, a phone with predictive text input, a phone with binary SMS possibili-
ties thus enabling “ring tones,” and picture “picture messaging,” a phone with con-
catenated SMS, a phone with chat messaging functionality, and several other types. 
The fi rst SMS was voicemail notifi cation, which simply indicated that there was a 
voice message waiting. This was usually indicated with an icon that lit up on the 
small screen and beeped. Voicemail was important because mobile phones are 
often turned off  for charging or for privacy or are out of  reach of  the network. 
Here Nokia launched the fi rst commercially available phone that could send and 
retrieve SMS. The input was made using the number keypad where each number 
corresponded to three characters. All other manufacturers soon developed the 
functionality to send SMSs.  Some kids had an amazing ability to use their thumbs 
to tap in SMS messages using abbreviations such as “c u l8er” for “See you later” 
and “smiley faces” to convey their mood.  
To make SMS input easier, Nokia licensed predictive text input algorithms called 
T9 from a U.S. company, Tegic Communications, that anticipate which word the 
user is trying to generate using a linguistic data base. The algorithm supports 
several languages and signifi cantly reduces the number of  keystrokes required to 
input a message. Today most phones use T9 from Tegic or similar algorithms, but 
there has also been attempt to attach a QWERTY keyboard to a mobile phone. 
For example, Ericsson launched such a keyboard as an accessory named chat-
board. There are also high-end terminals such as smart phones that make it easier 
for users to originate, reply to, and access messages through the built-in QWER-
TY keyboard rather than the limited keypad on standard mobile phones.
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The next great success for SMS-based services was ring tones. Once again Nokia 
was fi rst. Nokia had started its smart messaging protocol based on binary SMS 
rather than the standard text SMS. Nokia had expected this technology to be used 
for information services. It had languished for years until suddenly, in 2000, it 
found an application that allowed users to change the way their mobile phones 
rang. Nokia had now reached a clearly dominant position with more than 30% 
market share and could therefore introduce this service that was not compatible 
with the GSM standard; it actually created problems when users not using Nokia 
phones received binary SMSs that appeared as nonsense on the screen. 
Several operators objected that Nokia did not follow the existing standard and 
thus created problems in their helpdesks, but end users as well as ring signal 
developers loved the new service, and operators gave in to customer pressure. 
Because the network operators were unable to offer the ring tone suppliers fair 
and fl exible revenue sharing, the service providers started using interactive voice 
response (IVR) platforms to trigger the transmission of  ring tones. The ring 
tones market soon became a billion dollar market that few network operators 
even offered. This market was completely dominated by independent service 
providers who advertised in newspapers and magazines using so-called bulk SMS 
to distribute their ring signals and pictures.
Following the success with downloadable ring signals, Nokia introduced phones 
that could handle concatenated SMSs that were marked as optional in the stan-
dard by the time and not used by anyone else. Concatenated messaging allows 
longer messages, and the Nokia 3310, for example, automatically connects up to 
three messages to create a message almost three times longer than the standard 
SMS message. Strengthened by its success with ring signals, Nokia once again dis-
regarded the standard and the GSM community and implemented a feature that 
was not supported in other handsets. To further build on this new capability to 
send and receive more information in a concatenated SMS and to handle binary 
SMSs, Nokia introduced picture messaging. Picture messaging allowed the user to 
download pictures that could be used, for example, as screensavers; just as ring 
signals had been, this new service was dominated by independent service provid-
ers. In addition, Nokia introduced Club Nokia, which allowed a user to buy and 
download both ring signals and pictures.
The rest of  the phone manufacturers did not have the installed base and pull fac-
tor to drive the product development as individual companies. Therefore, initia-
tives were made in the standardization bodies to standardize around these new at-
tractive services introduced by Nokia, and the fi rst outcome was EMS (enhanced 
SMS). EMS standardized what Nokia phones already could do with ring signals 
and picture messaging, but now it was harmonized within the GSM standard, 
and Nokia after some pressure agreed to open up its specifi cations. The next real 
development in messaging was MMS (multimedia messaging), heavily pushed by 
Nokia, but now it had no diffi culty convincing other manufacturers and operators 
what direction messaging was going.
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7.3 The Technology
An SMS consists of  text of  up to 160 characters, which can be sent to a phone 
whether or not it is engaged in a call. Those 160 characters can consist of  words 
or numbers or an alphanumeric combination. Non-text-based short messages in 
binary format are also supported. The effect of  this is to give the mobile phone 
the facilities of  an alphanumeric pager, but with confi rmed delivery of  messages. 
Unlike with a pager, the system holds undelivered messages and resends them at 
intervals until receipt is confi rmed.
The Short Message Service is a store-and-forward service; in other words, short 
messages are not sent directly from sender to recipient, but always via a short 
messaging service center (SMSC). Each mobile telephone network that supports 
SMS has one or more messaging centers to handle and manage the short mes-
sages (see Figure 13 for a network overview and Table 10 for an explanation of  
abbreviations).
Discussions of  SMS usually refer to two basic point-to-point services. One is mo-
bile-originated (MO) short messages that are usually typed into the handset and 
then transported to the SMSC where they can be sent to another mobile or on 
to a network service, such as a Web application. The other is mobile-terminated 
(MT) short messages that are transported from the SMSC to the handset and can 
be sent to the SMSC from other mobile subscribers via MO or by other sources. 
Figure 13: SMS network 
structure
MS Mobile station
MSC Mobile services switching center
HLR Home location register
SMSC Short message service center
STP Signal transfer point
Table 10: SMS network struc-
ture overview
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The Short Message Service features confi rmation of  message delivery. This 
means that, unlike with paging, users do not simply send a short message and 
trust and hope that it gets delivered. Instead the sender of  the short message can 
receive a return message indicating whether the short message was successfully 
delivered.  
It is possible to send longer short messages with the help of  concatenation 
(stringing several short messages together) and SMS compression (getting more 
than 160 characters of  information within a single short message). These features 
have been defi ned and incorporated in the GSM SMS standards. 
Short messages can be sent and received simultaneously with GSM voice, data, 
and fax calls. This is possible because voice, data, and fax calls take over a dedi-
cated radio channel for the duration of  the call, and short messages travel over 
and above the radio channel using the signalling path. Thus users of  SMS rarely 
if  ever get a busy signal, even during peak network usage times. Even though 
SMS uses a dedicated signalling channel, it is not really possible to talk about 
bandwidth  because only one packet is sent. It is, however, possible to use the 
SMS signalling channel to WAP as defi ned in the WAP standard, and then the ef-
fective transmission is 2 to 3K bit/sec. 
The SMSC is an integral part of  the network—surprisingly so since this part of  
the network is not manufactured by the traditional network manufacturers. One 
reason for this was that the network suppliers did not realize the full potential of  
data communication until after the new SMSC suppliers had established a fi rm 
position on the market. Ericsson, for example, did not offer a stand-alone SMSC 
but integrated the SMCS with a voicemail answering service. This was the logi-
cal solution because this was what the standard described, and according to the 
standard was what the SMS should be used for. When SMS usage exploded, the 
integrated SMSC voicemail did not follow the market need and was soon termi-
nated.
7.3 Alliances
One of  the key features of  SMS is that the voice and signaling channels are 
separate and therefore can be used in parallel. This way the data transmission and 
messages can be both sent and received while the user is talking; the user does 
not have to dial a modem to set up a data connection but is always connected.
No one would buy a phone that could only call within a mobile network. Like-
wise, it is natural that a user should be able to call another user subscribing to 
another carrier’s services and regular landline phones. However, initially this was 
not the case for SMS, and interoperability for SMS traffi c was not possible until 
1997 in Germany and not until April 1999 in the UK, with the rest of  Europe 
following within a year. Once the interoperability problems started to be resolved, 
SMS traffi c increased many times over.
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In the same way that the calling party pays for the phone call in Europe, the send-
ing party pays for the outgoing SMS. When interoperability started to become 
more and more common and operators started to consolidate, the foundation for 
bulk SMS was laid. Bulk SMS is used by service providers who want to send SMS 
as part of  a service offering such as a stock information service. Another such 
service could be sending a free SMS from a webpage to a mobile phone. The ser-
vice provider uses this free service to attract users to the homepage and expects 
revenues from the other services on the homepage or simply banner advertise-
ments. 
Rather than paying the same price as a mobile user, the service provider negoti-
ates a bulk price with an SMS wholesale activity provider. The SMS wholesale 
agreement is made by someone who buys capacity from operators or by someone 
who owns an SMSC that is interoperable with other SMSCs. As an example, the 
Vodaphone-affi liated operator D2 received nearly one-third of  data revenue, or 
5% of  total revenue from bulk SMS.
As a result of  the escalating interoperability and the increased use of  bulk SMS, 
operators such as Vodaphone started to complain about the escalating number of  
incoming SMSs that spammed its users. The initial response was to simply block 
SMS from some SMSC owners, such as Swisscom’s SMSC, which was charged 
very little for sending an SMS. Vodaphone was followed by other operators who 
felt that the number of  outgoing SMSs was far less than incoming SMSs, and 
since mid-2001, several mobile operators have introduced an interconnect charge 
per message for every SMS sent to their subscribers. The interconnect fee is 
meant to balance the SMS traffi c between, for example, operators with many us-
ers and wholesale SMS providers with no users and only outgoing SMSs. 
Operator/Country Interconnect charges
Vodaphone/UK 0,08 Euro
Bouygues/France 0,08 Euro
Amena/Spain 0,10 Euro
Telefonica/Spain 0,10 Euro
All/Sweden 0,04 Euro
Quam/Germany 0,025 Euro
E-Plus/Germany 0,065 Euro
Viag Interkom/Germany 0,05 Euro
Table 11: Examples of  inter-
connect charges 
Source: http://
www.smsitaly.com
The network operator in a country will not allow roaming or interoperability be-
tween different networks. This means that a subscriber can receive a signal from 
a network, but if  this signal is not from the carrier subscribed to, the network will 
be blocked and inaccessible.
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7.5 International expansion
SMS usage in the United States is not high compared to that in Europe and some 
parts of  Asia. One of  the major reasons for this is the lack of  one standard such 
as GSM, even though this is changing with announcements from AT&T and 
others. Moreover, interoperability between U.S. operators is still far from being 
realized, and pricing is not consistent.
Unlike in Europe, the U.S. cellular industry and cellular operators had little incen-
tive to standardize services. For example, most U.S. operators chose not to imple-
ment two-way SMS, with the result that AT&T and Verizon phones could receive 
messages but could not originate them. Sprint phones are two-way, although the 
subscriber must choose the plan as part of  the service package. Voicestream/
Omnipoint is a GSM carrier that includes two-way SMS as part of  the basic ser-
vice. 
The interoperability issues could change as many U.S. operators begin to imple-
ment and shift to GSM technology. This is the same technology that is used in 
Europe, except for frequency. With a mobile phone replacement cycle of  ap-
proximately 18 months in the United States, and with interoperability issues being 
resolved, SMS usage is predicted to increase. Pricing and billing issues are also 
being discussed but will not be resolved until the service is fully available.
The U.S. pager industry is still larger than that in Europe because of  the good 
coverage provided by the Mobitex system. In Europe most pager communication 
is now done over mobile phones using SMS. If  Europe sets the stage for what 
is to come in the mobile market in North America, it is only a matter of  time 
before pagers become obsolete in the U.S. as well.
There are two other dynamics at work in the U.S. that need to be factored into 
the future of  SMS: instant messaging and two-way paging. American teens, used 
to zapping instant messages (IMs) in multiple windows, will be a tough crowd to 
convince that tapping short messages on cell phones is useful. And U.S. paging 
users prefer the small devices like the BlackBerry and the Motorola equivalents 
for sending messages, especially after these devices were picked up by everyone 
from kids to Capitol Hill staffers. 
7.6 Competition
Direct competition today to SMS is almost nonexistent in Europe because of  
the strong dominance of  GSM. The introduction of  new packet data services 
in 2.5G and 3G will enable a range of  new applications. However, new service 
offerings such as multimedia messaging, i-mode, instant messaging, and e-mail 
on a multitude of  different devices will very likely substitute for SMS. MMS is an 
expansion of  SMS in functionality, but even more important it is a continuation 
of  the established business model for SMS. The pay-per-message model would 
not likely be accepted for e-mails or instant messages, for example.
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8. Analysis
This chapter analyzes the cases, applying the theories and using the methodology discussed 
earlier. The cases are analyzed within themselves and compared with each other as well as with 
the theory in an attempt to extract the key elements of  a successful service strategy for the mobile 
Internet. 
8.1 Standards and the mobile Internet
When comparing the factors that are key assets, the difference between i-mode 
and BlackBerry is small, whereas they both differ greatly from SMS (see Table 
10). The reason is that SMS is an open standard and i-mode and BlackBerry are 
industry standards. The SMS column should be viewed subjectively as typical for 
an operator providing SMS. 
Critical factor i-mode BlackBerry SMS
Control over an installed base of  
users
yes yes no
Intellectual property rights yes yes no
Ability to innovate yes yes no
First- mover advantage yes yes no
Manufacturing capabilities no yes no
Strength in complements yes no yes
Brand name and reputation yes yes no
Table 12: Comparison of  
critical factors for 
standard develop-
ment
Control over an installed base of users
Both i-mode and BlackBerry have clear control over their installed base of  us-
ers; SMS does not. The control consists of  mainly three factors and is aiming at 
increasing switching cost and customer loyalty. First, these companies segmented 
the customer base and thus know more about the customer than just the phone 
number and billing address. Second, they keep personal user information for each 
customer, which is valuable and not easily or conveniently recreated. Third, they 
lock the user into a user paradigm, which includes the functionality of  the ser-
vice, the way of  billing, and the graphical user interface (GUI).
DoCoMo’s strategy for geographic expansion of  i-mode is to license and in some 
cases be a part-time owner of  the operator that deploys i-mode. When doing this 
DoCoMo loses the control of  customer base. In product expansion DoCoMo 
is trying to keep its customers while moving to the new 3G technology. The 
challenge DoCoMo faces is that the installed base of  users is only interested in 
switching if  there is a clear benefi t in doing so–for new services, for example–but 
the content provider is not interested in developing its service offering until the 
installed base is large enough. 
RIM is making a strategic geographic expansion with its BlackBerry service and 
licenses out its BlackBerry solution to European and Asian operators. In these 
markets it can benefi t from relationships with global companies already using 
BlackBerry in the U.S. and from their relationship with systems integrators and 
computer software manufacturers that sell to a global market. This means that 
RIM is giving up control over the installed base of  users.
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SMS is dependent on the GSM standard for its geographic expansion because 
of  its deep technical connection to the GSM architecture. As the telecommuni-
cation systems are opened up in the 2.5G and even more in 3G, the connection 
between next-generation SMS–e.g., MMS–and the network is much smaller. This 
means that another solution or group of  solutions originated from, for example, 
the computer industry could replace MMS. MMS allows for a great deal of  new 
services to be delivered, but the lack of  customer segmentation by the operators 
makes the service rollout hard. The operator therefore needs to gain control over 
the installed base of  users or lose business to service providers that have such 
control.
Intellectual property rights
All three service solutions have extensive intellectual property and know-how 
protection. The GSM standard is protected by patents held by the different par-
ticipants in the standardization forum but licensed from them to the same forum. 
The dependence between the networks and the SMS application makes it hard to 
separate out patents directly relating to SMS, but this is not the case when looking 
towards the follow-up MMS. The new multimedia messaging includes multime-
dia components, security components incorporated from other companies, and 
standardization bodies within both the computer industry and the media industry. 
Know-how, held by the various implementers of  the standard within the telecom-
munication industry, has been a barrier to entry because of  its complexity. These 
barriers will be reduced as, for example, the multimedia components of  MMS are 
developed outside the telecom world.
DoCoMo does not have many patents protecting the i-mode service but has 
extensive know-how of  the solution and owns the specifi cations as well. It is 
dependent upon technology providers to supply network and terminals as well as 
content providers to create value-added content that will fi t its technology solu-
tion. DoCoMo’s competition in Japan can supply the same content as DoCoMo, 
but the content provider needs to format the content to fi t. The reason for Do-
CoMo to choose proprietary solutions is mainly to be fi rst to market, but by not 
following standards DoCoMo has encountered problems when expanding to new 
markets outside Japan.
RIM’s BlackBerry solution and its handheld devices are patented. The enforce-
ment of  patents by legal action is traditionally stronger in the United States than 
in Europe, and RIM is actively protecting its intellectual property rights.
Ability to innovate
The ability to innovate would allow companies to make proprietary extensions 
to an existing standard. This is, for example, highly important for implementers 
of  SMS and is exemplifi ed by Nokia, which repeatedly and aggressively devel-
oped and implemented new solutions that in some cases did not even follow the 
standard. By focusing on messaging and putting resources into the development 
of  applications as well as services, its rate of  innovation was much higher than 
that of  its competitors; and even more important, Nokia’s decision to focus on 
messaging was strategically correct. 
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Early on, DoCoMo made a strategic decision to focus on the i-mode service. By 
rapidly forming a team to execute it, it quickly went through the development 
process and successfully launched the service. However, the other operators in 
Japan are positioning themselves as price pressers like KDDI and as product dif-
ferentiators like J-Phone, thus attacking DoCoMo from two fl anks.
RIM’s ability to innovate and extend existing standards has been successful, and 
the service is constantly expanding to satisfy new needs within RIM’s target mar-
ket. 
First-mover advantage
Both DoCoMo and RIM early on gained a fi rst-mover advantage by having done 
a lot of  product development and being far along the learning curve when com-
petition fi nally appeared. This advantage needs to be protected, but since both 
services are built on industry standards the fi rst-mover advantage becomes even 
stronger. 
Because the SMS standard is open to all companies participating, both Voda-
phone and Nokia were able to gain a fi rst-mover advantage. Their active in-
volvement in the standardization and aggressive product development ensured 
that they had products on the market early. One problem is that products being 
launched before the standard is ready and fi nalized could be forced to be changed 
to comply. Individual companies are making enormous political efforts to get 
standardization bodies to position the standard in ways that are most advanta-
geous to their companies’ products.  The attempts to openly standardize service 
models are very complicated because these are directly linked to a company’s 
business models and therefore mendaciously protected.
Manufacturing capabilities
To be able to successfully execute a product strategy based on an open stan-
dard such as SMS, it is clearly benefi cial to have good manufacturing capabilities 
because the competitive advantage of  having patent protection is limited. Nokia 
is one example how the mix of  the right product and market strategy turns into 
volume and economies of  scale. 
BlackBerry has chosen to maintain and expand its own manufacturing capabilities 
by focusing on being the fi rst to market with complex products. When opening 
up the BlackBerry platform to Java, the manufacturing capabilities of  devices will 
be less important to RIM.
DoCoMo only designs and makes specifi cations and therefore exercises a high 
level of  control over technology providers. DoCoMo does not have its own 
manufacturing.
Strength in complements
Companies with strength in complements will add to their overall profi tability by 
increasing their sale of  core products.  
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BlackBerry is promoting complements but lacks the fi nancial resources to really 
make a signifi cant difference.  DoCoMo is pushing to have i-mode accepted and 
is working on several fronts to increase the acceptance of  i-mode by promoting 
media components of  the standard, micro billing systems, and other features that 
would allow i-mode to expand.
Nokia is trying to complement SMS in various ways to make SMS even more 
adopted and thus sell more phones. Club Nokia, for example, is building up an 
online community that promotes value-added services such as ring signals, icons, 
and other features specifi cally for Nokia phones.
Brand name and reputation
Both BlackBerry and i-mode are well-recognized brand names, and both have 
been heavily promoted by RIM and DoCoMo. RIM has benefi ted from a grass-
roots campaign and tremendous media exposure through well-managed public 
relations. In the same way, i-mode has become synonymous with mobile Internet 
services, and there is no other mobile service that is close in comparison. Con-
sumers who buy an i-mode phone or a BlackBerry associate the brand names 
with many values.
SMS as well as GSM are both well known and can be used in marketing by 
companies that design, manufacture, and sell compatible products. The positive 
impact of  the words “GSM approved” is, however, more limited to business-to-
business relationships and not interesting for end users or consumers because 
they can only choose from approved products. 
8.2 Service profi t chain and mobile Internet value chain
The service profi t chain establishes the relationships between operating strategy 
and service delivery systems via the external service value received by customers 
and their concomitant satisfaction and loyalty, which generate revenue growth 
and profi tability. By replacing operating strategy and service delivery systems in 
Figure 6 with the mobile Internet value chain in Figure 4 we establish the service 
model that can be applied on the mobile Internet (see Figure 14). The extension 
from the original service profi t chain model is to apply it to technology develop-
ment, which in this thesis is called service-driven technology development, and 
more complex and yet undefi ned value chains such as the mobile Internet value 
chain. The extension from the value-chain model constituting the value-added 
activities is that the service and the feedback from the service become an integral 
part of  the mobile Internet value chain. 
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Figure 14: Service profi t chain 
and mobile Internet 
value chain
The feedback to the different parts of  the value chain from external service value, 
customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, and revenue growth, as well as profi tabil-
ity, is described in Table 13 for all three cases. The feedback from the elements 
in the service profi t chain should be viewed as a subjective average and to what 
extent the whole service profi t chain correlates to the fi ve different stakehold-
ers that constitutes the mobile Internet value chain. High correlation could, for 
example, be mean that a technology provider has direct interaction with custom-
ers in billing and/or feedback, and low correlation could mean that a technology 
provider has little or no end-user interaction. 
In a successful service offering the external service value is not only the cost but 
also the result achieved for the customer. Value is always relative and based both 
on perceptions of  the way a service is delivered and on initial customer expecta-
tions. The wireless application protocol (WAP) introduction is a good example of  
how expectations were raised to a level beyond what WAP could offer. When the 
service has the right external value, customer satisfaction and customer loyalty 
would be the next two steps that would drive growth and profi tability. DoCoMo 
exemplifi es this with the virtuous circle illustrated in Figure 10. In the virtuous 
circle DoCoMo creates the external customer value by increasing and refi ning the 
available content, which attracts more customers; likewise, with more customers 
DoCoMo is motivated to provide more customer value. BlackBerry can grow and 
become more profi table by increasing geographic coverage through agreements 
with operators, thus allowing corporate customers to have one global mobile 
service solution.
An important argument in services is that the “quality” of  market share, mea-
sured in terms of  customer loyalty, deserves just as much attention as quantity of  
share. This is exemplifi ed best with RIM’s BlackBerry enterprise solution, which 
has a segmented approach to targeting the enterprise market in a way that that 
can extract premium prices from traditional email by adding the value of  mobility. 
In contrast, short messages are an example of  quantity: the content–that is, the 
actual SMSs––is created and received by the users in a mobile environment that 
makes the ability to send and receive messages valuable. 
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CORRELATION I-MODE BLACKBERRY SMS
Content High High Low
Network Low Low Low 
System Integrator Low Low Low
Operator High Low High
Terminal Low High Low
Table 13: Correlation between 
service profi t chain 
and mobile Internet 
value chain
Content
In the i-mode and BlackBerry cases the correlation between content and the 
service profi t chain is high. In all three cases messaging and communication was 
the initial driver, but the transition to more value-added content-oriented services 
has been made by i-mode and BlackBerry, but not in SMS. Simplicity has been a 
driver in all cases, where simplicity means how complicated it is to activate and 
access the service. Simple access means that the service is just a click way without 
a complicated confi guration procedure.
DoCoMo succeeded in the i-mode case at implementing the virtuous circle, 
which exemplifi es a service model where the user can subscribe to value-added 
content and the content provider can get feedback about subscribers as well as 
service usage. By segmenting the content, DoCoMo ensured its ability to col-
lect data about what segments were popular and use this to improve and refi ne 
their offering. This approach has given DoCoMo valuable information about its 
customer base. DoCoMo can use the same segmented approach globally to make 
i-mode successful in new markets by allowing for local content.
By approaching a specifi c segment, RIM has to tailor its expanded service of-
fering accordingly. This is in strong contrast to the top-down technology and 
industry led approaches to other non-voice services such as WAP without a target 
market. RIM’s initial mobile email notifi cation and reply service has developed 
into a mobile personal information management (PIM) system and incorporates 
interfaces to the largest business software vendors. 
The SMS service is still a pure messaging service, and the incorporation of  
value-added services has not been easy. The standard was not initially aimed at 
value-added services, and many of  the pieces required to make a complete ser-
vice offering were missing. SMS was a triumph of  the consumer and grassroots 
revolution that the mobile industry, with few exceptions, had next to nothing to 
do with and only passively reacted to. Content providers have tried to create solu-
tions with the existing structure based on SMS, but have encountered problems, 
such as interconnect fees, because of  confl icting business interests. 
Network and systems integrators
The network and systems integrators have little or no interaction with the cus-
tomer but have an important part in the mobile Internet service chain because 
they will supply the hardware, and to some extent the software, that will enable 
services. The telecommunications industry (unlike the computer industry) is 
highly integrated, and there are high barriers to entry for new companies and 
new solutions.  Even a large company like Microsoft has problems entering this 
market for this reason. 
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Creating the new applications that are needed to successfully support a service 
offering is diffi cult because of  the high integration unless a company, like Do-
CoMo, can infl uence and control the network and system integrators—through 
specifi cations, for example. BlackBerry created its own solution and was able to 
do so because of  its experience in the telecom industry and its acquired knowl-
edge of  the business software industry. The initial success of  SMS was immedi-
ately explored by nimble and agile companies on the server side doing SMSCs, 
but because of  their limited control over the other parts of  the system they could 
not expand their offering. 
Network manufacturers have also pursued a different approach depending on the 
market requirements. In Japan, DoCoMo makes highly detailed specifi cations that 
force manufacturers to produce specialized products for DoCoMo. The manu-
facturers’ economies of  scale are if  course limited there because they are not able 
to sell their products to other operators and markets unless DoCoMo approves 
of  this in their franchise model. In Europe, where the GSM standard is stronger, 
special solutions are rare, although they exist. The lack of  customization possibili-
ties affects the service offering because there is little or no unique functionality to 
a network built on the GSM standard, and the high degree of  integration makes 
it hard for customization in an application layer.
Operators
The biggest difference in the operator’s relation to the service profi t chain and 
the customer is evident when comparing i-mode and BlackBerry. In the i-mode 
case DoCoMo controls every piece in the value chain and profi ts from the charg-
es for both subscriptions and traffi c. However, in the BlackBerry case the opera-
tor was initially a “bit-pipe,” meaning that the operator was not directly involved 
in the service but simply provided the access channel to the customer.
RIM and DoCoMo are also using different strategies to expand their markets. 
DoCoMo has decided to franchise its service model to other operators, giving 
them access to the i-mode specifi cations as well as the network of  other estab-
lished i-mode players in the value chain, such as content providers and terminal 
manufacturers. RIM is leaving its earlier business model of  buying airtime from 
operators; it is partnering with and offering the BlackBerry service to opera-
tors that need a complete corporate service offering. By doing this RIM is giving 
away control and is making the operatormore actively involved in the BlackBerry 
service model.
In SMS, the operator has a strong relation to the service profi t chain, but its 
role has been to promote the functionality and to fi nd offerings, very often new 
handsets, that attract younger customers. Service development is restricted to 
what equipment manufacturers can offer; even if  there is an interaction between 
operators and equipment manufacturers about functionality, the standard is likely 
to be followed without exception.
Services on the Mobile Internet
65
Terminals 
The terminal has a high correlation to the service profi t chain in the Black-
Berry case and a lower correlation in the i-mode and SMS cases (Table 13). As 
discussed earlier, the SMS service provider is a traditional telecommunications 
operator. An analysis of  Nokia and Club Nokia would have shown that the cor-
relation between the service profi t chain and the mobile Internet value chain for 
the SMS case is similar to the BlackBerry case. 
The concept of  Club Nokia sprang from Nokia’s messaging achievements; Club 
Nokia is a portal for Nokia owners where they can access content and download 
supplements to their phones. With this service Nokia is competing with opera-
tors, and once again the strength Nokia possesses as the largest handset manu-
facturer allows the company to pursue this track even if  it infringes on the GSM 
standards and confl icts with operators business models. 
In the i-mode case the terminal manufacturers are controlled by the operator to 
a higher degree than both the SMS and BlackBerry. The highly integrated hand-
sets are more or less custom designed for DoCoMo and not compatible with any 
other network. In contrast, the phones built on the GSM standard can function 
in any GSM network unless they are locked with the help of  the SIM card (Sub-
scriber identity module). The ability to lock a handset to a network is important 
for the operator because operators subsidized the terminals heavily and therefore 
need to keep their customers long enough to recoup their investment. 
RIM designs and manufactures its own terminals. Those terminals are only com-
patible with the BlackBerry solution and will not function unless the customer 
also subscribes to the service. The ability to control the handset is clearly impor-
tant, and in RIM strategy the control will shift from controlling the integrated 
handset to controlling the Java application. This is done in the expectation that 
terminals in the future will be less integrated and open up their interfaces for 
outside applications and remote management. 
8.3 Service, application, and network
The services on the mobile Internet will become more and more competitive 
with time, and timely launches of  new and improved services will be critical to 
success. To bridge the gap between the service profi t chain and the parts of  the 
mobile Internet value chain that have little interaction with consumers, it will be 
important to ensure that network technology providers and system integrators 
develop technology in line with service requirements. The complexity of  the 
systems and the problems developing an integrated approach indicate that the 
industry is breaking up in a similar way as the computer industry.  It is clear that 
service and applications are separating from the network and the terminal (Figure 
15). RIM, for example, has announced its strategic attempt to offer the BlackBer-
ry solution on a Java platform, which would make the service agnostic as to what 
terminal it is running on as long at there is Java support.
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A stand-alone application is not the same as a complete service offering. In i-
mode the email client would not have been enough to create value for DoCoMo, 
and Blackberry would not have been successful with simply a device. SMS was 
successful initially, but the application-only approach has been a limiting factor 
to all parties in the value chain when trying to create value-added service based 
on SMS. SMS has been successful as a communication solution, involving only 
the operator and the traditional technology provider, being a two-communication 
expansion from voice. Further, the lack of  a service approach has been limiting 
in the WAP case, and that is likely because of  the similar approach to standardiza-
tion. SMS is an application and not a service, whereas i-mode and BlackBerry are 
service solutions.
The key to managing this separation is to use service-driven technology develop-
ment and thus maintain complete control over the mobile Internet value chain by 
connecting it to the service profi t chain. The approach has proven successful for 
BlackBerry and i-mode, and the lack of  service-driven technology development 
has stopped the progress of  SMS. Complete control does not necessarily mean 
that everything has to be in-house, but it needs to be under control by the ser-
vice developer through, for example, alliances (as in the BlackBerry case) or core 
knowledge translated into specifi cations (as in the i-mode case).
Separation with clear interfaces also allows for open standards to function with-
out trying to openly standardize the business models, which has proven to be 
unattractive to service providers. The open standards should be concentrated in 
the infrastructure and to some extent in applications that need to be built so that 
services can reach a critical mass. The mobile industry needs to realize either that 
it can delay the mobile Internet revolution by refusing to cede control to the end 
user and application and service development communities—or that this will be 
taken away from it by the markets by force. 
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9. Results
This chapter primarily sets forth the results of  the analysis, but also evaluates the theories and 
methods used. The three main results relate to the differentiation between applications and 
services, the effect of  mobile Internet services on standards, and service-driven technology develop-
ment. The main conclusion is that service-driven technology development can be applied to the 
mobile Internet value chain as a way of  developing, implementing, and maintaining profi table 
services on the mobile Internet.
9.1 Service-driven technology development
The service-driven technology development model is based on a requirement 
that the service profi t chain receive feedback in an effi cient way.  This has proved 
to be successful for both BlackBerry and i-mode because all players in the value 
chain are clearly aligned with the services offered. The study shows that the avail-
ability of  good quality content, a clear billing structure, revenue-sharing, and a 
sustainable service business model among network operators, service providers, 
content providers, and equipment vendors needs to be established before wire-
less data services will boost return on investment (ROI). The key to profi table 
services on the mobile Internet is a service-driven approach, which in this thesis 
is called service-driven technology development.
The service profi t chain is a model of  a profi table service chain, and as such it 
can be used as a design guideline for the total service offering. The complete val-
ue chain has to be considered from the beginning. When the development stage 
is completed and service is launched, the service-driven technology development 
model should be used to make incremental changes and refi nements. There is 
clearly a need to have a good connection between service and technology devel-
opment. The DoCoMo case shows the importance of  having a complete and 
cross-functional team executing a clear service-driven technology strategy.
In the SMS case the service profi t chain was initially closed, but when the value 
chain expanded from simple SMS messages being sent via the operator to incor-
porate value-added services and content providers, it broke down. Standardiza-
tion has helped to incorporate some of  the missing parts, but with little success 
so far. The companies involved in standardization are willing to standardize on 
technology but unwilling to give information on business and service models. 
This is especially true for smaller companies that are typically inventors of  new 
technology.
9.2 Mobile Internet and standards
All cases show that the key to profi tability is when the service profi t chain directly 
controls the seven critical factors in the value chain  (see Table 3). From this it 
follows that open standards do not work on mobile Internet services. In addition, 
profi table business models are achieved by doing things differently than your 
competitors. Doing things differently means either performing different activi-
ties or performing similar activities in different ways. The service loop does not 
give feedback to a standardization body; it gives feedback to stakeholders who are 
directly involved, who use this feedback to make strategic decisions about devel-
opment, implementation, and maintenance. 
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There could the be several reasons why these companies do not provide feed-
back; for example, the people representing the companies in the highly techni-
cal standardization bodies may not have access to business related information 
and strategy intentions within the company, or the companies could fear losing 
a competitive advantage by giving information away. In addition, changes in the 
value chain will change the control of  the critical standards factors (Table 3) and 
thus take away companies control of  the industry standard. Finally the open stan-
dard is not moving fast enough just because they are compromised by business 
objectives. 
The mobile industry would do well to realize that success in providing nonvoice 
services involves setting the right environment to allow them to succeed: ensur-
ing that everyone implements the same open standards in the same ways, putting 
the right payment and micro billing technologies in place, and recognizing that it 
takes time to build a critical mass of  usage. 
9.3 Application versus service
By separating services, as illustrated in Figure 10, this control becomes possible 
because the services and their business models will be separated from the more 
highly technical applications and networks as well as terminals.
Facing a mature market for voice service forced  operators to merge in order to 
achieve economies of  scale. They were thus easily persuaded by technology pro-
viders to invest in new products that would expand their product offerings. The 
mobile industry now needs to realize either that it can delay the mobile Internet 
revolution by refusing to cede control to the end user and application and service 
development communities, or that the markets will take control away from it by 
force. 
9.4 Evaluation of theories and methods
Resource-based and competitive industry analysis is clearly valid to analyze and 
describe services on the mobile Internet (Prahlad 1990; Porter 1996). Porter 
argues both that earlier business strategy theories hold true for the Internet and 
that they are even more necessary to analyze the changes that have occurred (Por-
ter, 2001). I would like to argue that the same applies for the service profi t chain: 
it holds true for the services on the mobile Internet and is a valuable framework 
for analyzing and describing new service offerings.
The case methodology (Table 1) together with the framework of  building theory 
from case study research (Table 2) provide valuable insight into the cause and 
effect of  successful services on the mobile Internet. Further, the novel combina-
tion of  the value chain (Figure 4) and the service profi t chain (Figure 6) to form 
a theory of  service-driven technology development can be specifi cally applied to 
services on the mobile Internet (Figure 14).
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The introduction of  service-driven technology development expands both the 
service profi t chain and the value chain. The service profi t chain is expanded 
by applying the service model to the whole value chain; together with the seven 
critical factors (Table 3),  this illustrates what level of  control the service provider, 
independent of  its position in the value chain, needs to apply to be profi table. 
The mobile Internet value chain as a business model is expanded by adding profi t 
and growth feedback on all activities and by focusing on external service value 
and customer loyalty. 
The need for successful service offerings and the convergence of  industries to 
form the infocom industry (Figure 1) are forcing the highly integrated mobile 
industry to break up (Figure 15), similar to the computer industry as described by 
Geoffrey Moore (Moore, 1991). This breakup will change the marketplace and 
force involved players to adapt to the situation or be left out. The key to estab-
lishing a service profi t chain is to gain control using the seven critical factors and 
successfully implement service-driven technology development.
9.5 Precision and generalization
Because the industry is immature and is going through a highly volatile period, 
these results may not be completely accurate. The vast amount of  information 
available and the scope of  the thesis made the selection process diffi cult and 
likely reduced the precision of  the details. However, I believe that the interviews 
provided valuable and accurate information and that the cases are representative 
as success stories. 
I believe it is possible to generalize the results for services on the Internet; the 
theory around standards is evenly based on examples from the Internet and from 
the networking economy (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). However, there are some 
differences between the mobile Internet and the Internet besides the wirelessness 
of  the mobile Internet:  the biggest are the payment infrastructure and the need 
for a higher level of  security on the mobile Internet.
9.6 Suggestions for further study 
The limitations of  time and resources available for this study present several op-
portunities for further investigation. Topics of  interest might include a service 
chain audit and a product development study for services on the mobile Internet.
A service chain audit study could result in an expansion of  auditing questions 
(Heskett, 1994) and provide further insight into critical factors in the service 
profi t chain as they apply to the mobile Internet. 
A product development study might expand on service-driven technology devel-
opment. A more detailed description of  the product development process might 
outline necessary activities as well as milestones using the foundation described in 
this thesis. An audit could serve as a checklist during the development process.
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